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South Africa needs additional funds for public infrastructure investment. Value Capture 
could potentially be implemented as a mechanism to raise additional funding. Value 
Capture depends on maximising land value. Ownership constraints to land 
development prevent land value from being maximised. The study uses doctrinal legal 
research to investigate how the principles found in South African mineral rights 
legislation overcome ownership constraints to developing mineral rich land to its 
highest and best use. The study also investigates how these mineral rights principles 
could be applied to land in general, in order to overcome ownership constraints to 
development. Within this context the study demonstrates how land might be 
expropriated for development purposes, and how such expropriation could create 
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South Africa envisions eradicating poverty and inequality by focussing amongst other 
things on faster economic growth and higher investment and employment; 
strengthening links between social and economic strategies and building collaboration 
between private and public sectors (National Planning Commission, 2011). Some of 
the critical requirements to realising this vision include a strong focus on public 
infrastructure investment, as well as densifying cities, improving transport and building 
a society that minimises travel time between the workplace and home (National 
Planning Commission, 2011). 
South Africa plans on spending R22.9 billion on upgrading commuter rail services and 
R143.8 billion on municipal infrastructure over the three years following the 2014 
budget (Gordhan, 2014). Public works projects such as these can produce benefits 
that are immediately capitalised into surrounding land values (Peterson, 2009). Cities’ 
ability to finance necessary infrastructure will significantly depend on their ability to 
capture a portion of these land value gains, to pay for the infrastructure (Peterson, 
2009). With its significant commitment to infrastructure expenditure, in the light of a 
budget deficit of four per cent in 2013/14 (National Treasury, 2014), South Africa 
should consider capturing land value increases to finance infrastructure investment 
(Brown-Luthango, 2011). 
1.1 Background 
The process of generating funds for infrastructure development by identifying 
increases in land value that were brought about by public investment in infrastructure, 
and capturing these value increases for funding government expenses can be defined 
as Value Capture (Mathur & Smith, 2012).  
1.1.1 Value Capture 
There are four stages in the Value Capture process, namely: the creation of property 
value, the calculation of additional value created, capturing of the value created and 
finally using the funds from the captured value (McGaffin, Napier & Gavera, 2013). 
Value Capture in South Africa requires the realisation of two broad outcomes, which 




authorities to capture the value increment for the purpose of investing in infrastructure 
(McGaffin & Gavera, 2012). 
Value Capture mechanisms found in the literature include the sale or lease of publicly 
held land, public-private development partnerships, betterment levies, development 
impact fees, acquisition and sale of excess land, and various land value taxation tools 
(Peterson, 2009; Mathur & Smith, 2012; Zhao et al., 2012). 
1.1.2 Creating incremental land value 
Value Capture is dependent on maximising the value of land, because incremental 
value that might be captured is created when land value is maximised (McGaffin, 
Napier & Gavera, 2013; Peterson, 2009). 
Land owners are assumed to be rational payers – motivated by self-interest – who will 
because of a profit motive generally strive to maximise the value of their land (Furubotn 
& Pejovich, 1972). Land is most valuable when it is developed to its highest and best 
use. The highest and best use of land is defined by the Appraisal Institute (2008:278) 
as “the reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property that 
is legally permissible, physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, 
and that results in the highest value”. 
The value of land with development potential is typically calculated using the residual 
method of valuation (RICS, 2008; Appraisal Institute, 2008). The residual value of land 
equals the difference between the income that the land will generate when it is 
developed to its highest and best use, minus all development costs (including 
reasonable developer profit, but excluding the purchase price of the land) which are 
associated with developing it from its current use to its highest and best use (Appraisal 
Institute, 2008). 
From the definition of highest and best use one identifies three aspects that collaborate 
in order to realise higher value potential on land: the market and the property’s physical 
characteristics need to support the higher and better use, development and legal rights 
need to be obtained on the property, and an entrepreneur needs to be willing and able 
to capitalise on the opportunity. 
In terms of the market and physical aspects of highest and best use; investment in 




possible (Smith & Gihring, 2006). Generally the highest and best use of properties 
increase because of the improved accessibility and amenity created by infrastructure 
(Rodríguez & Mojica, 2009). Improved accessibility and amenity typically bring more 
people into an area, creating favourable market conditions that demand more property 
space such as offices, retail space and homes in the area. 
Regarding the legal aspect of highest and best use; government permission is required 
to develop land to a higher use in South Africa, as land use is government regulated 
according to the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, No. 16 of 2013 
(SPLUMA, 2013). In terms of this act, municipalities are to define in their Spatial 
Development Frameworks (SDF) areas within which specific property uses are 
envisioned. Land use rights can be applied for in accordance with the SDF. The 
approved zoning and use rights of each portion of land within a municipality is recorded 
in the municipality’s Land Use Management Scheme (LUMS). Land use rights are 
classified and defined under different usage zonings, such as agricultural, industrial, 
commercial and single or multi-residential land.  
Land may only be developed in accordance with its zoning, as set out in the LUMS. If 
land falls within an area earmarked on the SDF for a higher and better use, the owner 
of the land may apply for and be granted re-zoning to that higher use. Such re-zoning 
is likely to be granted by the state, provided that the community has no objections to 
the higher use on the specific land. The use rights recorded in the zoning of land are 
attached to the land, and typically vest in the owner of the land. 
If the market favours development in an area and government consent for 
development is obtainable, a property developer entrepreneur might want to capitalise 
on the opportunity of developing the land. A developer would have to acquire the use 
right from the landowner in order to develop the land (Badenhorst, Mostert & Pienaar, 
2006). Typically this is done by purchasing the land or by entering into an agreement 
where the landowner acquires a share in the profits of the envisioned development 
project. 
Ownership constraint to development is said to happen when development cannot 
take place, because the necessary ownership rights cannot be acquired fast enough 
through normal market processes (Holtslag-Broekhof et al., 2014; Adams & Hutchison, 




rise to meet demand at the right time, place and price – fails in the development land 
market, because of such ownership constraints (Adams et al., 2001; Lichfield & Darin-
Drabkin, 1980). In essence, the rights vested in landownership are able to prevent 
land from being developed to its highest and best use. Landowners have the right to 
not sell land to developers, or to price it unrealistically high. In this way, land ownership 
effectively prevents land value from being maximised – and therefore prevents 
incremental land value from being created by developers. Value Capture – which 
seeks to capture incremental property value – is constrained because land ownership 
rights prevent the creation of incremental property value. 
This constraint could potentially be overcome by applying principles that are found in 
mineral rights legislation to property development in general. 
1.1.3 Mineral rights – an alternative model for property development rights 
Mining and mineral rights utilisation is in essence a highest and best use of land, to 
which land owners cannot prevent development. 
As with other property development, the three factors determining highest and best 
use of land are also at play in mining and mining-related development of mineral rich 
land. Market demand for the land use needs to exist (in this case: the extraction of 
minerals, rather than the creation of building space), permission from authorities is 
required (MPRDA, 2008) and an entrepreneur needs to be willing to capitalise on the 
opportunity. 
In terms of the legal aspect, South African legislation on mineral rights offer some 
interesting concepts in how a right to develop and profit from land is created and 
governed (MPRDA, 2008; White paper: A minerals and mining policy for South Africa, 
1998): 
- The right to mine and profit from minerals (i.e. to use and develop land) can be 
held separately from the ownership of land. 
- The owner of the land with mineral deposits can lose the right to use and 
develop his land, if he does not exercise the development right and develop the 




- A person interested in exploiting minerals and accordingly developing mineral 
rich land to its highest and best use, can through a process apply to government 
to acquire the relevant rights over another person’s property. 
- Legislation deems exploitation of minerals to be a preferential use of land, 
allowing a holder of mineral rights to enforce this use of the land over most 
other uses. 
- Expropriation of land is possible to assist the mineral rights holder with 
enforcing his right to exploit minerals and develop the land accordingly. 
The mining industry maximises land value by generating substantial revenue from land 
use (Chamber of Mines of South Africa, 2014; Appraisal Institute, 2008). South African 
mining companies typically pay the landowner a three to five per cent royalty on the 
value of minerals extracted from his land, which might go as high as seven per cent in 
exceptional cases, and ten per cent in diamond mining (Hartman, 2015). These 
royalties – when capitalised – give a land value which is normally higher than the land 
value realisable for any other use of the land. Mineral rights legislation thus enables 
willing parties to acquire mineral rich land for mining related development, and thereby 
promotes developing mineral rich land to its highest and best use.  
The question arises whether the principles found in the mineral rights legislation can 
also be applied to provide developers with access to non-mineral land with 
development potential. This question is worth investigating, because developers might 
maximise land value by developing the land to its highest and best use if they are 
given access to the land. This development would then create incremental land value, 
which effectively maximises the potential for Value Capture.  
1.2 Problem statement 
The problem to be addressed by this study is summarised as: 
Landownership rights can prevent real estate developers from developing land to its 
highest and best use, which constrains land value and limits the Value Capture 





1.3 Research questions 
The research questions to be answered by this study are: 
- How does landownership prevent real estate developers from developing land 
and maximising land value in South Africa? 
- Can the development promoting principles from mineral rights legislation be 
applied to non-mineral land, to enable developers to develop land without being 
constrained by landownership? 
1.4 Research proposition 
This study will test the proposition that: 
The development promoting principles found in mineral rights legislation can be 
applied to non-mineral land, which enables developers to develop land without being 
constrained by landownership - leading to land value maximisation and opportunities 
for incremental land Value Capture by public authorities. 
1.5 Aims 
The aim of this study is to investigate how acquiring and enforcing the right to develop 
land without negotiating with property owners might create an effective value capturing 
mechanism.  
The study therefore aims to: 
1. Demonstrate how landownership prevents real estate developers from 
developing land and maximising land value in South Africa. 
2. Determine whether the development promoting principles found in mineral 
rights legislation can be applied to non-mineral land, to enable developers to 






The research questions will be answered by realising the following objectives. 
 Reviewing the literature on: 
o Value Capture and how it might be applied to fund the infrastructure 
investment envisioned by South African government. 
o How land ownership obstructs the maximisation of land value. 
 Applying a methodological approach applicable to legal research: 
o A doctrinal legal research approach will be applied – which is typically 
applied to answer what the law is and how it applies to a particular 
situation. 
  Applying a research design that is able to conduct doctrinal legal research: 
o Legal discourse will be conducted. It is an argumentative writing process 
that is typically used to conduct doctrinal legal research. It gathers legal 
data and interprets it by stating the law and developing new connections 
and ideas about how it is applicable in a particular situation. 
 Concluding on whether legislative principles found in mineral rights law can be 
applied to promote development of non-mineral land. 
1.7 Research methodology 
A literature review will be conducted to answer the first research question, and 
determine how landownership prevents real estate developers from developing land 
and maximising land value. To answer the second research question, research within 
a legal research paradigm is required. 
Doctrinal legal research will be conducted, which determines what the law is and how 
it applies in a particular context (Chynoweth, 2008). This study will construct a 
hypothetical case to determine whether the South African legal framework offers 
developers opportunities to acquire and enforce the right to develop land without being 
constrained by landownership. This will be done by writing a legal discourse – which 
reflects the reasoning process that judges and lawyers use when they review legal 
documents and synthesise the results thereof into an overall principle (Dobinson & 
Johns, 2007). A doctrine will be presented that might guide legal practitioners in 




developable land, or demand unreasonable high prices for such land. The legal 
discourse will endeavour to argue that it is desirable to overcome ownership 
constraints to development, and that it is possible to do so within the South African 
legal framework. 
1.8 Structure of the report 
Chapter one provides an introductory background to Value Capture in the South 
African property rights context, from which the problem statement is formulated. The 
research questions and research proposition are stated, and aims and objectives of 
the study are formed. Furthermore, the research methodology is introduced and 
limitations of the study are described. 
Chapter two provides a literature review on Value Capture, demonstrating its 
desirability in the South African context. It is shown that Value Capture could be 
applied to fund South African infrastructure investment, and it is concluded that Value 
Capture is a matter of national interest. The chapter also conducts a literature review 
on how development and the maximisation of land value is constrained by property 
ownership. 
Because Value Capture is indirectly constrained by land ownership, the study sets 
forth to determine whether the South African legal framework offers developers 
opportunities to acquire and enforce the right to develop land without being 
constrained by landownership. 
Chapter three describes the research methodology applied in this study. It sets the 
research paradigm, within which it proposes a doctrinal legal approach to research. 
The legal data gathered in the study is presented and analysed in chapter four of the 
report. South African mineral resources legislation is found to overcome ownership 
constraints to value maximisation. Developers are able to acquire and enforce the right 
to develop mines and mining related structures on mineral rich land, without being 
constrained by property owners. Expropriation is even used in extreme cases to 
enable those who have acquired mineral rights to use and develop the land over which 




The study draws a comparison between government’s policy and intent for 
development of mineral rich land, and government’s policy and intent for development 
of non-mineral land. The comparison justifies that the principles found in mineral rights 
legislation should also be applied to non-mineral land, to provide developers with 
access to the land when sellers refuse to sell or demand unreasonable prices.  
The study further demonstrates how the principles found in mineral rights legislation 
might be applied to enable a developer to legally acquire land for development when 
the owner refuses to sell or demands an unreasonable price. Expropriation for the 
purpose of maximising land value could be constitutionally justified within the context 
of Value Capture and other national land priorities.  
1.9 Limitations and delimitations 
Findings of this study are primarily based on interpretive reasoning by the researcher. 
The research proposes and tests a controversial political and economic concept, 
which would have to undergo practical implementation, court rulings and extended 
public commentary before it can be accepted as a definite means of furthering the 
Value Capture motive. 
This paper is not to be considered as professional legal counsel. It is solely intended 
for academic purposes, which include stimulating discussion on the topic among 
academics and practitioners. The author and the university accept no liability for the 






2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature study reviews South Africa’s need for infrastructure funding and reviews 
Value Capture as a potential funding source for public infrastructure. It reviews the 
workings of Value Capture and finds examples of where Value Capture was 
successfully used to fund public infrastructure. It determines that maximising land use 
and land value is important for the success of Value Capture programs. 
2.1 South African development focus 
The National Planning Commission (NPC) of South Africa advises on issues impacting 
the long term growth of South Africa by means of a National Development Plan 
(National Planning Commission, 2011). The report lays the strategic plan whereby 
South Africa seeks to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030, which is briefly 
summarised by the NPC (2011:10) as: 
“In 2030, the economy should be close to full employment; equip people 
with the skills they need; ensure that ownership of production is less 
concentrated and more diverse (where black people and women own a 
significant share of productive assets); and be able to grow rapidly, 
providing the resources to pay for investment in human and physical 
capital.” 
 
Focus areas include faster economic growth and higher investment and employment, 
as well as strengthening links between social and economic strategies and building 
collaboration between private and public sectors (National Planning Commission, 
2011). Realising this vision requires amongst others a strong focus on public 
infrastructure investment, densifying cities, improving transport and building a society 
that minimises travel time between the workplace and home (National Planning 
Commission, 2011). 
2.2 South Africa’s need for additional infrastructure funding 
In accordance herewith R22.9 billion is budgeted for upgrading commuter rail services 
and R143.8 billion on municipal infrastructure over the three years following the 2014 
budget (Gordhan, 2014). The municipal infrastructure budget for the three years 
following the 2015 budget was increased to R145.5 billion (Nene, 2015), 




South Africa however had a budget deficit of four per cent in 2013/14 (National 
Treasury, 2014) and three point nine per cent in 2014/15 (National Treasury, 2015). 
This budget deficit is still expected to exist in 2017/2018, despite it narrowing to two 
point five per cent by then (National Treasury, 2015). As a result, alternative funding 
sources are needed to finance the required infrastructure. Internationally such 
alternative funding has been raised through the concept of Value Capture.  
2.3 Value Capture  
2.3.1 Defining Value Capture 
Value Capture broadly describes the process whereby public authorities extract 
additional value accruing to a property because of public investment, in order to effect 
or fund a public purpose (McGaffin, Napier & Gavera, 2013). The value that the term 
refers to may include the financial value of rising land value, as well as the 
achievement of planning and developmental objectives such as densification of urban 
areas or inclusionary housing programmes (Rodriguez & Mojica, 2008). 
In essence, extracting monetary value from land through Value Capture comprises of 
four stages (McGaffin, Napier & Gavera, 2013): 
 creation of additional property value 
 calculating the additional value created 
 capturing the value 
 using the funds for public purpose 
2.3.1.1 Creation of additional property value 
Because Value Capture is aimed at extracting the incremental land value that is 
created by infrastructure investment, it goes without saying that any such project is 
dependent on the land value actually increasing – and hopefully being maximised. 
The value of land is maximised when the land is developed to its highest and best use. 
The Appraisal Institute (2008:278) defines the highest and best use of land as “the 
reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property that is 
legally permissible, physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, 




This definition of highest and best use highlights several factors that influence and set 
upper limits for the use of the land. The use must be legally allowed, the physical 
characteristics of the land and its surroundings must be such that the intended use is 
possible, and sufficient market demand needs to exist for the type of land use so that 
it can be developed and sold or leased into the user market. Within these constraints 
there might be several possible uses for any land, but the highest and best use is the 
single use that would result in the highest value. 
In order to realise any potential value of land, the land would have to be developed. A 
valuation method for land with development potential is required when determining the 
land values realisable in the various possible uses. The residual method of land 
valuation is typically used in valuing land with development potential (RICS, 2008; 
Appraisal Institute, 2008). The residual method calculates land value by deducting all 
development costs required for realising the intended use from the value of the 
completed development (Appraisal Institute, 2008). The cost of land is excluded from 
development costs in this calculation, as it is the variable that one aims to calculate. 
In simple terms residual land value is equal to what is left after all other costs are 
deducted from a development project’s income. 
2.3.1.2 Examples of infrastructure leading to higher land value 
Public infrastructure assists with the movement of people and resources between 
neighbouring areas – creating accessibility and amenity for land (Kastrounia, Heb & 
Zhangc, 2014). The improved accessibility and amenity brought about by 
infrastructure investment is generally thought to be a driver of land value increase 
(Dorantes, Paez & Vassallo, 2011; Rodríguez & Mojica, 2009). Investment in public 
infrastructure may improve the highest and best use of land by raising its physical 
limitations and improving the market demand for land use in the areas near the 
infrastructure (Smith & Gihring, 2006). 
Improving transportation infrastructure enables more profitable land use, leading to 
regional economic growth (Chen, 2015), improved agricultural output (Tong et al., 
2013), production growth (Cohen & Paul, 2007) and improved industrial output 
(Moreno & López-Bazo, 2003). Several studies showed that access to transport 
infrastructure and transport stations positively influences the values of retail, office and 




Martínez & Viegas, 2009; Hess & Almeida, 2007; Debrezion, Pels & Rietveld, 2007; 
Clower & Weinstein, 2002; Haider & Miller, 2000; Damm et al., 1980). 
There are however environmental, social and economic components to the positive 
effects that sewers, highways and other public infrastructure create – making it difficult 
to measure the positive effects (Lemer, 1999). The percentage of value increase 
attributed to new infrastructure investment is furthermore difficult to determine in 
relation to other factors that might also drive value changes (Debrezion, Pels & 
Rietveld, 2007; Banister & Thurstain-Goodwin, 2005). 
Land value increase however relies heavily on how well the opportunity for value 
increase is managed by the person controlling the land (McGaffin, Napier & Gavera, 
2013). This study therefore does not focus on value increase that might potentially be 
created when infrastructure investment takes place, but looks to when the person 
controlling the land acts upon the potential. Value increase might be determined more 
accurately when rights are acquired to develop land to a more profitable use. This 
might be done by calculating the difference between the residual land value of the 
proposed development and the current use property value (ignoring the potential for 
development). Accordingly, the focus of the literature review shifts towards land 
development – which changes land use from its current to a more profitable type of 
land use. 
2.3.2 Examples of successful development Value Capture 
The literature offers many examples of where incremental land value, brought about 
by developing land to a higher use, was successfully captured to finance public 
infrastructure investment. Examples from Egypt, Columbia, China, India and Brazil are 
discussed to illustrate the concept. 
2.3.2.1 Egypt – New Cairo 
In New Cairo a 3360 hectare development was undertaken to provide much needed 
property, to accommodate Egypt’s growth. The development, called Madinaty, was 
undertaken by the Alexandria Company for Urban Development, who was given free 
desert land by government in return therefor that the developer will install internal 
infrastructure valued at £E110 per square meter and external infrastructure valued at 




furthermore provided the state with low-income houses equal to seven per cent of the 
total development costs. 
2.3.2.2 Bogota - Columbia 
A concept called valorización was administered in Colombia, combining elements of 
benefit capitalisation and cost recovery (Peterson, 2009). Land parcels that were 
located in districts where re-zoning for higher density or conversion of land from rural 
to urban use had been approved, could have been subject to a betterment levy of 
between 30 and 50 percent on the price increment that a landowner enjoyed as a 
result of the planning authorisation. Payment of the levy was due when the value gain 
was realised, i.e. when the land was sold or developed. 
Between 1997 and 2007 Bogota financed 217 public works projects such as street, 
bridge, and drainage improvements through valorización (Rojas Rojas, 2007; Saldies 
Barrenocha, 2007). The mayor of Bogota furthermore announced plans to raise 
Col$2.1 trillion or US$1.1 billion to finance citywide infrastructure improvements 
between 2008 and 2015 through valorización (Peterson, 2009). 
2.3.2.3 China - Changsha 
Changsha, China offers an example of maximising the leverage of land values into 
infrastructure (Peterson, 2009; Peterson, 2007). A six-lane highway costing about 
US$730 million was projected in 2001. The municipality used a public-private joint 
venture company listed as the Ring Road Corporation on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, and financed the total cost of the highway at a zero out-of-pocket cost. 
The municipality transferred land-use and development rights for 200m wide land 
strips on both sides of where the highway was planned to the Ring Road Corporation, 
totalling about 3300 hectares. Before the highway, only about 1200 hectares thereof 
had significant market value form existing infrastructure access and development 
approvals. Roughly half of the highway’s cost was financed upfront through the sale 
of leasing rights to the land with infrastructure services. Remaining land would have 
been sold once the highway was built and market value thereof was increased. The 






In 2006 the Indian prime minister authorised an investment plan of about US$10 billion 
for modernising the country’s airports (Peterson, 2009). More than seventy five per 
cent of the costs would be financed by public-private partnerships, where private 
partners had the responsibility of managing the airports. The most of airports’ revenue 
does not come from aviation activities, but comes from using the land that surrounds 
the airport for non-aviation activities such as hotels, restaurants, convention centres 
and commercial-industrial centres (KPMG, 2008).  
Land for these airport developments was contributed to the partnerships mainly by the 
government, who acquired land by means of compulsory acquisitions. This raises 
issues relating to the use and justification of compulsory acquisitions of land – known 
in South Africa as expropriation – and the standards used in determining the market 
based compensation in such cases (Peterson, 2009). 
2.3.2.5 Brazil - São Paulo 
Incremental land value generated by infrastructure projects can be captured by selling 
rights to convert rural land to urban land, and by selling rights to build at greater 
densities than would normally be allowed (Peterson, 2009). 
Certain areas in São Paulo, Brazil were earmarked for development, and within these 
areas development rights – called Certificates of Additional Construction Potential 
bonds – were sold upfront to finance the infrastructure required to service the areas 
(Sandroni, 2010). 
In the 410 hectare development area of Faria Lima land values rose from around 
US$300 per square meter before public development, to US$7000 per square meter 
thereafter. The municipality offered development rights to construct 2.25 million square 
meters of floor space. These rights sold for prices up to US$630 per square meter of 
allowable floor space. Between 2005 and 2009 approximately 42 percent of the 
envisioned floor space construction stock was sold, generating a total of US$190 
million in revenue to finance infrastructure for the district. 
This approach demonstrates the concept of government creating land value potential 
by granting the right to add floor space beyond normal zoning restrictions, and thereby 




The abovementioned examples all demonstrate Value Captures’ dependency on first 
creating additional land value, before it can attempt to capture it. Enabling property 
developers to develop land with development potential can therefore be seen as an 
important factor in the success of a Value Capture program. 
2.4 Ownership constraints to land development 
Developers might however be prevented by landowners from developing land with 
development potential. Owners of property rights in land hold powerful positions in 
urban redevelopment programmes, which they could use to pursue their own goals 
(Muñoz Gielen, 2010). This section of the literature review specifically aims to 
determine the role that land ownership plays in developing urban land to higher and 
better use. 
A determining factor in the success of any land development project is land assembly, 
which involves acquiring ownership of the land and removing any existing limited real 
rights in the land that might be able to prevent development (Adams & Hutchison, 
2000; Gore & Nicholson, 1991). The feasibility of redevelopment projects can be 
harmed by costs and delays in the land assembly stage of a development project 
(Adams & Hutchison, 2000). 
Ownership constraint happens when land development cannot proceed because the 
necessary ownership rights cannot be acquired fast enough through normal market 
processes (Holtslag-Broekhof et al., 2014; Adams & Hutchison, 2000). Adams and 
Hutchison (2000) conducted an extensive empirical study on ownership constraints in 
eighty potential large redevelopment sites in Britain. The study revealed that 
ownership constraints disrupted use, marketing, development or purchase in 64 of the 
80 sites researched between 1991 and 1995.  Adams et al. (2001) demonstrate that 
ownership constraints to developing a site may either arise because of deficiencies 
and limitations to the extent of ownership rights in the land, or because of strategies, 





2.4.1 Classification of ownership constraints 
Ownership constraints can be divided into five categories (Adams et al., 2001; Adams 
& Hutchison, 2000). The five categories are: 
 Ownership is unknown or unclear 
 Ownership rights are divided 
 Assembly of land and ownership rights is required for development 
 Owners are willing to sell, but not on terms that potential purchasers can 
accept 
 Owners are unwilling to sell 
2.4.1.1 Ownership unknown or unclear  
In the first category of ownership constraint, title deeds may be incomplete or missing, 
or the ownership of land may be in dispute (Adams et al., 2001). This would have the 
effect that the developer would not know with whom to contact in order to acquire 
ownership rights – stalling or even preventing development. 
South Africa has an established deeds registry system, which in most cases rules out 
this category of ownership constraint in the South African land development market 
(Deeds Registry Act, No. 47 of 1937, as amended, 2006).  
2.4.1.2 Ownership rights divided  
Property ownership is said to be a basket of rights, containing all the possible legal 
entitlements to land that exist (Badenhorst, Mostert & Pienaar, 2006).  An owner might 
however cede some of these rights to other people, who then obtain a limited real right 
in the land. The owner of land must allow the holders of limited real rights to exercise 
their rights in the land (Van der Walt & Pienaar, 2009). 
As redevelopment of land is likely to interfere with the exercise of limited real rights, 
such rights have to proverbially be put back into the basket by re-acquiring them from 
their respective holders. Re-acquiring the limited real rights in land is the second 
category of ownership constraints that hinders redevelopment of land (Adams et al., 
2001). 
In South African Property Law limited real rights include praedial and personal 




land such as mortgages, and tacit security such as hire purchase and lessor’s 
hypothecs and builders’ lien (Mostert & Pope, 2010; Badenhorst, Mostert & Pienaar, 
2006). Land use rights may also have been leased out. These rights are enforceable 
by their holders, who might prevent developers from using the land for development. 
Re-acquiring all these rights would be necessary before development could safely take 
place, during which time the feasibility of developing the land might lapse.  
2.4.1.3 Ownership assembly required for development 
The third category of ownership constraints found by Adams et al. (2001) relate to the 
assembly of multiple pieces of land for a development site.  
Adams et al. (2001) describe what they call a ransom strip; a piece of land that is too 
small to be developed on in isolation, but that is essential for the development of 
adjacent land – as it provides access from the development site to a public road. 
A site might also have to be assembled from multiple pieces of land that belong to 
different owners. Where a developer buys out multiple pieces of adjacent land, the last 
owner to sell his land to a developer is afforded an exceptional strong bargaining 
position (Swope et al., 2011).  Adams et al. (2001:468) note about this category of 
ownership constraint, that while more profitable developments afford developers 
greater leeway to bargain for land purchase, it is often exploited by sellers of land to 
“extract even higher payments from any developer”. 
When sellers initially withhold selling their property in order to sell it and bargain for 
more money later in the land assembly process, it is termed holdout (Mailath & 
Postlewaite, 1990). Miceli and Segerson’s (2012) model for holdout predicts that 
unsold land prices will rise as the land assembly process progresses, and that the final 
seller will receive the highest price. 
Such strategic delay in selling leads to inefficient allocation of land (Menezes & 
Pitchford, 2004) and may prevent or significantly delay development of land 
(Plassmann & Tideman, 2007). The model of Miceli and Segerson (2012) identifies 
holdout problems, which include that the sum of the prices paid for the various land 
parcels may exceed the value of the project to the buyer, which causes that some 
efficient projects may have to be foregone. The holdout problem furthermore raises 




the urban fringe where ownership is less dispersed and lot sizes are larger (Miceli & 
Sirmans, 2007; Miceli & Sirmans, 2004).  
Although Plassmann & Tideman (2007) would prefer that private bargaining should be 
used to attain efficient land assembly, Adams et al. (2001) found that holdout as a 
form of ownership constraint is difficult to resolve without prospects for lucrative 
commercial development or government intervention. Results from an experimental 
study by Swope et al.  (2011) suggest that government subsidy or compulsory 
acquisition might be required to overcome the holdout problem. Miceli and Sirmans 
(2007) also support government’s forced taking of land as a method of enabling 
developers to overcome the holdout problem and acquire land in city centres. Miceli 
and Segerson (2012) support the notion that compulsory taking might be necessary, 
especially where the sellers are able to judge with certainty that the buyer is committed 
to purchasing the land. 
2.4.1.4 Owner willing to sell on unacceptable terms 
The fourth category of ownership constraints found by Adams et al. (2001) is where 
sellers place unacceptable terms on the sale of their land, which include restrictive 
conditions of sale and unrealistic price expectations. 
Unrealistic price expectations could include setting too high asking prices for land, or 
holding unrealistically high expectations of the land’s value and refusing to entertain 
offers below that expected value. A seller’s perception of value might also be based 
on historical values that fail to adjust for economic decline (Adams et al., 2001). 
Owners might also be unwilling to sell below book valuation or acquisition cost 
(Howes, 1989), possibly reflecting a reluctance to accept that sunk costs have no 
market value and are not recoverable when exiting the property investment (Mata, 
1991). Three categories of sunk costs in land transactions are set-up costs that reflect 
the initial capital investment, accumulated sunk costs that reflect the normal costs of 
conducting business, and sunk costs upon exit (Clark & Wrigley, 1995). 
In the study conducted by Adams et al. (2001) on eighty large development sites in 
Britain, twenty-one sites were affected by owners setting unrealistic conditions upon 




ownership constraint was found, it caused significant or very significant disruption to 
the development.  
2.4.1.5 Owner unwilling to sell 
The last category of ownership constraints found by Adams et al. (2001) is where the 
owner is not willing to sell the land to a developer. This category of ownership 
constraint disrupted twenty-nine of the eighty sites researched, causing significant or 
very significant disruption in eighty per cent of the instances where it was present. The 
disruption was mainly attributed to owners retaining land for continued occupation or 
for developing the land themselves at a later stage. Delayed marketing because of 
uncertainty or because of speculation also caused constraint in some cases. In five of 
the cases land was retained for no specific purpose (Adams et al., 2001). 
Landowners do not respond equally to the development and profit opportunities that 
their land offers. The main reasons why owners wish to retain ownership of land is to 
occupy it, to hold it for investment purposes, to make the land available to others on a 
non-profit basis or for control (Goodchild & Munton, 1985). Retention for control 
specifically aims to prevent development of land, possibly to protect land’s amenity, 
preserve a view, maintain a historical connection, or act as a buffer between own and 
neighbouring uses (Adams et al., 2001; Moss, 1981).  
Retention for eventual own development might see land underutilised for many years 
(Adams et al., 2001). Manufacturing owner-occupiers are likely to retain land for 
possible development many years into the future, so that space is available in case 
their operations need to expand. It is however difficult to distinguish whether owners 
who retain land for subsequent development do so because of a long-term investment 
strategy or as a precaution (Adams et al., 2001). Retention for subsequent sale could 
be because of indecision caused by the seller’s bureaucratic decision-making 
structures, or because it will be more advantageous to sell at a later stage because of 
considerations such as the seller’s tax position (Adams et al., 2001; Goodchild & 
Munton, 1985). Tax considerations likely to influence a seller in South Africa include 
estate duty and capital gains tax (SARS, 2015). 
Selling land involves risk, uncertainty and transaction cost for the seller (Evans, 1999). 




marketability and value of the land, or because they are uncertain about their own 
future needs (Howes, 1989).  
Land may also be retained for speculative purposes, hoping to get more money by 
selling at a later stage. This either entails a passive approach – holding land in the 
hope that land market values will rise, or an active rent-seeking approach where 
owners try to increase the site value by pursuing planning permission for higher and 
better use (Adams et al., 2001; Benson, 1984). 
Inertia – doing nothing with land – could also be encountered as a constraint where 
small portions of land are owned by entities for whom the opportunity cost of keeping 
the land dormant is better than devoting the time, effort and cost necessary for selling 
the land (Adams et al., 2001). 
2.4.2 Resolving ownership constraints 
Adams and Hutchison (2000) argue that although most ownership constraints might 
be resolved over a period of time, the time and resources that it requires could prevent 
redevelopment. The property development market cycle affords short windows of 
opportunity for many proposed development sites (Barras, 2005), which might be 
missed altogether because of delays caused by ownership constraints. In such cases, 
sites could potentially remain underutilised until the next upturn in the development 
cycle or even longer, because of ownership constraints. 
The literature review shows that ownership constraints applicable to South African 
land development could be caused by division of ownership, difficulty in assembling 
land and land rights for development, owners placing unacceptable conditions and 
prices on the sale of their land, or owners simply refusing to sell their land. 
Based on South Africa’s need for infrastructure funding and the value capturing 
potential that is realised when land is developed to higher and better use, it is worth 
researching whether the South African legal framework offers developers 
opportunities to overcome these ownership constraints. One might narrow this down 
to asking whether the development promoting principles found in mineral rights 
legislation can be applied to non-mineral land, to enable developers to develop land 
without being constrained by landownership. The next chapter will outline the 




3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section sets out the research paradigm within which the research will be 
conducted, as well as the research strategy that will be used to answer the research 
questions. 
The research questions to be answered are: 
- How does landownership prevent real estate developers from developing land 
and maximising land value in South Africa? 
- Can the development promoting principles from mineral rights legislation be 
applied to non-mineral land, to enable developers to develop land without being 
constrained by landownership? 
The literature review conducted in this study has already answered the first research 
question, while the answer to the second question can be found by conducting an 
appropriate research study. The nature of the second question is seated firmly in the 
legal domain, and research of a legal nature will have to be conducted to answer it. 
3.1 Research paradigm 
The research paradigm is set by describing the ontological and epistemological 
position of the researcher in terms of the topic. Ontology describes the nature of the 
phenomenon being researched, while epistemology describes the nature and basis 
for acquiring knowledge about the topic – especially referring to the limits and validity 
of such knowledge. The methodological approach that is typically used for studying 
legal topics is also presented. 
Typical legal analysis relates more to the subjective, argument-based methodologies 
of the humanities than to the detached, data-based analyses of the natural and social 
sciences (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Chynoweth, 2008). Legal research is a new 
phenomenon in the built environment, compared to other built environment disciplines 
such as management, economics, law, technology and design (Chynoweth, 2008). 
When critics from these other disciplines evaluate legal research, they should be 
careful to evaluate it as legal research and should not unduly try to mould it into the 
paradigms and methodologies associated with their disciplines (Bedulskaja, 2014; 





The ontology of law describes the underlying assumptions of what the law is and what 
law consists of (Engle, 2008). Reality in the legal domain consists of shared beliefs 
about valid legal norms. A valid legal norm is a social and conventional fact that exists 
because society mutually believe in it and shape their behaviour according to it 
(Aarnio, 2011). 
The most common ontological view on law simply divides reality into either legal rules 
or cases (Valente & Breuker, 1994). Knowledge about law therefore simply relates to 
what the legal rules are, and how they apply to specific cases. 
3.1.2 Epistemology 
In order to gain knowledge about the law, a researcher interprets the mutual beliefs 
about valid legal norms and combines beliefs into a coherent whole (Aarnio, 2011). At 
an epistemological level, typical academic legal research is defined as a normative 
process of doctrinal analysis (Chynoweth, 2008). 
Doctrinal legal research is placed within the humanities research tradition, because 
the methodologies typically used in doctrinal legal research correspond to those used 
in the humanities (Hutchinson, 2010; Northrop, 1947). It makes use of interpretive, 
qualitative analysis (Hutchinson, 2010; Chynoweth, 2008). This differs 
epistemologically from the type of questions asked by empirical investigators in other 
built environment research areas, such as management, economics, law, technology 
and design disciplines (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Chynoweth, 2009; Chynoweth, 2008).  
Legal rules are normative in character, dictating and prescribing how people ought to 
behave – as opposed to any attempts to explain, predict, or understand how people 
behave (Kelsen, 1967). In doctrinal research the researcher acts as a participant in 
creating knowledge by searching for legal rules and arguing how it should apply (Hart, 
2012). It can therefore be described as research in law, as opposed to research about 
law (Arthurs, 1983). 
Doctrinal research asks ‘What is the law?’ in particular contexts, in order to discover 
and develop legal doctrines for publication in academic works (Hutchinson & Duncan, 
2012). Scholastic arguments are developed, to subsequently be criticised and 





Axiology is the science of moral choice and fundamental values – seeking to determine 
whether research is value biased or value neutral (Grix, 2010). 
Doctrinal legal research is normally expected to be subjective and value-biased, 
because the application and interpretation of legal rules in any given situation is based 
on reasoning and logic – much similar to the humanities (Engle, 2008). 
3.1.4 Summary of research paradigm 
Ontologically the phenomena to be studied are legal rules and cases. 
Epistemologically the knowledge about the phenomena relates to what the legal rules 
are and how the legal rules apply to specific cases. The axiology of the research can 
be classified as value biased and subjective. 
3.2 Methodology 
Methodology – the study of research methods and their use – is concerned for any 
particular research project with how it should be conducted (Grix, 2010). As shown in 
the ontology and epistemology sections, doctrinal legal research will be required for 
this study. This section will discuss the methodology, focussing on answering what is 
typically done in doctrinal legal research projects, and why this is done. In the section 
after this one, a research design is provided that is able of conducting doctrinal legal 
research. 
Doctrinal legal research involves developing scholastic arguments to be subsequently 
criticised and reworked by other scholars (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012; Chynoweth, 
2008). Any so called methodologies in legal research are at most employed 
subconsciously by scholars and lawyers, who consider the process to be an exercise 
in logic and common sense, rather than the formal application of methodology 
expected by typical scientific researchers (Chynoweth, 2008). Lawyers would typically 
answer ‘what is the law?’ for real and well-defined situations, while legal scholars 
would typically answer it hypothetically for a class of situations in order to inform 




This study will go about answering the question of what the applicable law is and what 
the outcome might be when a developer wants to acquire land for development, while 
the owner of the land is unwilling to sell or demands an unrealistic sales price. 
Such legal reasoning typically involves applying a legal rule to a factual situation by 
means of deductive logic, as discussed by MacCormick (1978). The formula R + F = 
C, or Rules plus Facts yield a Conclusion can be used to summarise this process. First 
a general rule is identified, which prescribes a certain outcome if particular facts are 
present. An example of a legal rule is ‘If a person drives a vehicle on a public road 
between one and five kilometres per hour faster than the speed limit, he should pay a 
fine of R300; and if between six and ten kilometres per hour faster than the speed limit, 
he should pay a fine of R700’. Second the factual situation in question is described. In 
this example a person might have been caught driving 68km/h in a 60km/h zone. 
Conclusion is then drawn on whether the rule applies to the facts in the particular 
situation, and whether the prescribed legal outcome should accordingly take effect 
(MacCormick, 1978). The fact in this example is that the person was driving 8km/h 
faster than the speed limit. The conclusion reached is that the second rule is therefore 
applicable – prescribing that he should pay a fine of R700, which he is accordingly 
obliged to do. Following this deductive logic process, the study will find legal rules from 
relevant acts of parliament and apply it to the hypothetical situation of acquiring land 
for development. 
This deductive logic model will however often be inadequate to produce a conclusive 
answer on what the law and applicable outcome is in complex situations (Hart, 2012). 
This is because legal rules are expressed in general terms capable of several 
interpretations – requiring further analysis. Where such further analysis is required, 
judicial decision makers are guided by the social conventions within the legal 
community, known as the rules of legal discourse (Bell, 1986). Such further analysis 
involves verbally manipulating the available sources of law, intending to solve the legal 
problem by discovering the underlying logic and structure of the rules and how they 
should be applied (Smith, 2009). This verbal manipulation of legal rules represents the 
dominant paradigm for legal scholarship and practice, despite academic criticism of 




The study will accordingly require a research design that is able to find and verbally 
manipulate legal rules, in order to propose feasible solutions for when developers want 
to acquire land that owners are not willing to sell, or land for which landowners ask too 
high a price.  
3.3 Research design 
In order for the research to be recognised as a contribution to knowledge, the research 
design and research outcome must be deemed to have been reliable and valid. 
3.3.1 Validity 
Scientific research in natural and social sciences collects empirical data as a basis for 
developing or testing theories; where research validity is based on whether the 
investigation process that was followed measures the correct constructs 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). The validity of doctrinal legal research findings is however 
unaffected by the empirical world (Chynoweth, 2008). 
Because of the normative character of the law, the validity of doctrinal research does 
not rely on an appeal to any external reality, but inevitably rest upon developing a 
consensus about the findings within the scholastic community (Chynoweth, 2008). 
Doctrinal research can therefore be seen as a step in the direction to consensus on a 
doctrine, and is accordingly expected to generate discussion and criticism within the 
legal community. Validity of the research will therefore only be revealed in time, as 
other legal scholars respond to the research. 
3.3.2 Reliability 
Reliability is concerned with the consistency of research findings – asking whether 
similar observations would be made by other researchers that have similar 
methodological training, similar understanding of the research setting and similar 
rapport with the members of the research setting (Stebbins, 2001). 
As stated earlier, legal analysis is not dictated by a ‘methodology’ in the same sense 
as the term is used in the sciences. It rather involves reasoning, using a variety of 
techniques to construct a convincing argument according to accepted, instinctive 
conventions of discourse within the discipline (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012). Credibility 




to accepted conventions and norms of legal discourse (Chynoweth, 2008). This is 
achieved by applying recognised patterns of reasoning that exist in the legal 
community, to supplement the deductive model. One such pattern of reasoning is 
analogical legal reasoning, which involves examining previously resolved court cases 
that are apparently similar, to determine whether the specific factual situation falls 
within the ambit of a rule (Hart, 2012). Another is inductive legal reasoning – which 
creates general rules from specific previously resolved cases to supplement legal 
reasoning (MacCormick, 1978). 
3.3.3 Research method 
Doctrinal legal research is a qualitative type of research that is done to analyse the 
complex legal environment. Legal discourse is a commonly used method of 
conducting doctrinal legal research within the complex legal environment (Freeman & 
Farley, 1996). Legal discourse will therefore be used to collect and analyse data for 
this study. 
This section provides an understanding of what legal discourse is and how it is done 
– bearing in mind the notion stated earlier that most legal scholars consider the legal 
research process as an exercise in logic and common sense, rather than the formal 
application of methodology. An understanding of what legal discourse is and how it 
works, will not only guide the researcher in conducting the study, but will also enable 
the reader to appreciate that appropriate procedures are indeed followed by the 
researcher. 
Legal discourse is a writing process that creates knowledge by writing about legal rules 
and their application in hypothetical cases and situations that have not yet occurred 
(Rideout & Ramsfield, 1994; Berthoff, 1981). It serves as an independent source of 
knowledge, because it alters and enriches the nature of legal thought with new 
connections and ideas about the law and its application (Kissam, 1987). Freeman and 
Farley (1996) model legal discourse as an information structure where arguments are 
presented by connecting claims with supporting data, and also as a dialectical process 
where opposing sides alternate in presenting their arguments. It can be described as 
a conversation between the student as a reader and as a writer – negotiating meaning 
through a series of argument statements about the law, the legal context and the 




Accordingly, this study will engage in a writing process with the intent of stating the 
law and developing new connections and ideas about how it is applicable to the 
hypothetical case of developing property and acquiring land for development, when a 
land owner refuses to sell or demands an unreasonable price. 
Legal writers should reason on paper so that their conclusions are self-evident and 
necessary (Jaff, 1986), which can be done by formulating and arguing a thesis 
(Volokh, 1998). A thesis statement is an original, supportable assertion about a topic 
– articulating a problem and targeting a specific aspect of the law with the intent to 
resolve the problem (Lambert & McLamb, 2013). A hypothetical case could be 
developed and argued to demonstrate how the law applies and what the outcome 
should be, if ever such a case were to present itself in the future. This study will 
accordingly formulate and argue a thesis statement and hypothetical case in a written 
legal discourse. 
Volokh (1998) provides the process to follow in constructing a legal discourse: 
- The first step is to concretely show that there is a problem, to which the study 
should present a novel, non-obvious and useful claim about the law that could 
resolve the problem. 
- Secondly the background facts and legal doctrines applicable to the claim 
should be provided. 
- In the next step the proof for the claim must be presented; proving the claim on 
doctrinal and policy levels, and demonstrating that it is practical and morally 
sound. Theoretical arguments must be demonstrated with concrete examples 
from real cases and realistic hypotheticals. 
- Lastly any interesting implications and twists that arise from the discourse 
should be connected into the existing broader academic debates on the topic, 
in order to derive a useful solution to the problem statement. 





4 RESEARCH ANALYSES AND FINDINGS 
The legal discourse described in the research methodology chapter is applied in this 
chapter. 
In accordance with the methodology, the introduction section demonstrates the 
problem, and presents a novel, non-obvious and useful claim about the law that could 
resolve the problem. 
4.1 Legal discourse – step one: Introduction 
It has been demonstrated in this study that South Africa is committed to significant 
investment in public infrastructure over the coming years, for which it has to explore 
additional sources of financing. The literature review has shown that Value Capture is 
a possible option for financing South Africa’s public infrastructure. It was also 
demonstrated in the literature review that Value Capture is dependent on maximising 
land value through development. The literature review also showed that ownership 
constraints to property development could prevent maximisation of land value, which 
limits the Value Capture opportunities that might be utilised to finance infrastructure in 
South Africa. 
Ownership constraints to developing a site may arise because of deficiencies and 
limitations to the extent of ownership rights in the land, or because of strategies, 
interests and actions of people who hold the ownership rights (Adams et al., 2001). 
Five categories of ownership constraints were shown to exist in the literature, of which 
four categories were applicable to South Africa. One such constraint is that ownership 
rights in South African land might be divided because of lease agreements, praedial 
and personal servitudes granted over land or acquired by means of use, express 
security held over land such as mortgages and tacit security such as lessor- and hire 
purchase hypothecs and builders’ lien. The opportunity to develop specific land might 
pass while a developer has to try and re-assemble and re-acquire all these rights 
before development could take. As a developer tries to assemble adjacent pieces of 
land, sellers that hold out the sale of their land gain bargaining power. This ownership 
constraint can drive the total land price of a development so high that development 




unrealistic price expectations that could prevent developers from acquiring 
developable land. Owners might even be unwilling to sell their land altogether. 
A solution to these ownership constraints is proposed, because land development is 
desirable within the context of funding South Africa’s infrastructure through Value 
Capture. It is accordingly necessary to determine what opportunities the South African 
legal framework offers developers to overcome ownership constraints to land value 
maximisation. 
The problem can be summarised as “Landownership rights can prevent real estate 
developers from developing land to its highest and best use, which constrains land 
value and limits the Value Capture opportunities that might be utilised to finance 
infrastructure in South Africa”. 
The problem would be resolved if the South African legal framework offered 
developers opportunities to acquire and enforce the right to develop land without being 
constrained by landownership. Mineral rights offer principles that promote land 
development and overcome ownership constraints. Therefore, as a solution to the 
problem, this discourse will argue the claim that “The development promoting 
principles found in mineral rights legislation can be applied to non-mineral land, which 
enables developers to develop land without being constrained by landownership”. 
4.2 Legal discourse – step two: Background facts and legal doctrines 
In order to establish the context within which the claim is made, this section provides 
background information on the facts and legal doctrines that apply to property 
ownership rights and the regulation of property development. It also describes how 
mineral rights legislation overcomes ownership constraints in developing land to its 
highest and best use. National policy and national objectives on land with development 
potential is also described. 
4.2.1 How is development regulated 
In absolute terms, property is best described by the Roman Law concept of dominium. 
Dominium includes all the possible rights that a person could own over a thing: usus 
(the right to use the thing), fructus (the right to the fruits of the thing) and abusus (the 




Dominium over land grants the holder thereof the right to do whatever he wants to on, 
under or above his land (Mostert & Pope, 2010). When dominium is unrestricted, the 
owner would absolutely be able to decide what to do with his land – the ‘an’ (whether 
to do or not to do), the ‘quomodo’ (how, in which way, what for), the ‘quantum’ (how 
much) and the ‘quando’ (when) (Van der Walt & Pienaar, 2009). 
Property rights in land ownership are however restricted in almost all countries with 
mature legal systems (Needham, 2006). Both private law and public law restrict the 
exercise of rights in land. Private law regulates the relationship between individuals in 
terms of their property, while public law regulates the relationship between the 
government and individuals in terms of their property (Badenhorst, Mostert & Pienaar, 
2006). Public law allows the state to impose restrictions on the use of land rights, and 
also to compulsorily take away land rights from the holder thereof (Mostert & Pope, 
2010; Needham, 2006). 
In South Africa the use of land and the development thereof is primarily regulated by 
the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, number 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA, 
2013), which came into effect on 1 July 2015. The act provides a “system of regulating 
and managing land use and conferring land use rights” (SPLUMA, 2013:1(1)). The 
purpose of determining the use and development of land within a municipal area is to 
promote economic growth, social inclusion and efficient land development, and also 
to minimise the impact of development on public health, on the environment and on 
natural resources (SPLUMA, 2013:25(1)(a)-(d)). 
The act imposes restrictions on the use of land rights (SPLUMA, 2013:3), with the 
object to: 
“(a) provide for a uniform, effective and comprehensive system of spatial 
planning and land use management for the Republic; 
(b) ensure that the system of spatial planning and land use management 
promotes social and economic inclusion; 
(c)  provide for development principles and norms and standards; 
(d)  provide for the sustainable and efficient use of land; 
(e)  provide for cooperative government and intergovernmental relations 




(f)  redress the imbalances of the past and to ensure that there is equity 
in the application of spatial development planning and land use 
management systems.” 
The restrictions are imposed by means of land use schemes, which must be adopted 
by all municipalities. A land use scheme essentially includes a map that indicates the 
zoning of land parcels within the municipal area, and “regulations setting out the 
procedures and conditions relating to the use and development of land in any zone” 
(SPLUMA, 2013:25(2)(a)-(c)). Land may only be used according to its specific zoning. 
A land use scheme must “give effect to and be consistent with the municipal spatial 
development framework” (SPLUMA, 2013:25(1)). In section 12 (1) of SPLUMA (2013) 
a spatial development framework (SDF) is defined as a policy document that interprets 
and represents the spatial development vision of the government, in order to guide 
planning and development decisions and guide spatial planning and land use 
management. In essence it is a holistic policy document that guides decisions made 
regarding land use restrictions, in order to achieve the outcomes desired by 
government and society as a whole. 
According to SPLUMA (2013:26(2)(a)), land may only be used for the purposes 
permitted by a land use scheme. It is considered a punishable offence if a person “(b) 
uses land contrary to a permitted land use” or “(c) alters the form and function of land 
without prior approval in terms of this Act” (SPLUMA, 2013:58(1)). 
Measures are in place for a municipality to enforce its land use scheme. These 
measures, stated in SPLUMA (2013:32(2)), include that: 
“A municipality may apply to a court for an order- 
(a) interdicting any person from using land in contravention of its land use 
scheme; 
(b) authorising the demolition of any structure erected on land in 
contravention of its land use scheme, without any obligation on the 
municipality or the person carrying out the demolition to pay compensation; 
or 
(c) directing any other appropriate preventative or remedial measure.” 
4.2.2 Obtaining development rights 
Land within a municipal area may typically be utilised for the 'land use' specified in the 
Land Use Management Scheme of that Municipality. Land use means “the purpose 




scheme or in terms of any other authorisation, permit or consent issued by a 
competent authority” (SPLUMA, 2013:1(1)). 
The act works on a restrictive basis. SPLUMA effectively works by approving or 
prohibiting the exercise of real rights that already exists in land – through granting or 
refusing development rights in terms of such real rights. No real right in land pertaining 
to land use or land development may be exercised without the corresponding use 
rights or development rights. If a person wishes to develop land, he would have to 
already hold such use right or development right in terms of legislation that preceded 
SPLUMA, or he would have to apply to the relevant public authority for development 
rights in terms of SPLUMA. 
Development rights means “any approval granted to a land development application” 
(SPLUMA, 2013:1(1)). For the purpose of the act, land development includes “the 
erection of buildings or structures on land, or the change of use of land, including 
township establishment, the subdivision or consolidation of land or any deviation from 
the land use or uses permitted in terms of an applicable land use scheme” (SPLUMA, 
2013:1(1)). 
Applying for development rights essentially means applying to change the approved 
land use (commonly referred to as its zoning) on the Land Use Management Scheme 
(LUMS) to a more intensive type of land use. Land use is defined by SPLUMA 
(2013:1(1)) as “the purpose for which land is or may be used lawfully in terms of a land 
use scheme, existing scheme or in terms of any other authorisation, permit or consent 
issued by a competent authority, and includes any conditions related to such land use 
purposes”. Once the land use is changed to such a higher use, the land may 
accordingly be constructed or developed upon. 
SPLUMA does however not only limit what land may be used for, but in conjunction 
with other laws also specifies who may use the land. SPLUMA (2013:45(1)) states that 
a land development application may be applied for by the owner of land, the owner’s 
duly authorised agent, or “a person to whom the land concerned has been made 
available for development in writing by an organ of state”: 
“(1) A land development application may only be submitted by- 




 (b) a person acting as the duly authorised agent of the owner; 
 (c) a person to whom the land concerned has been made available for 
development in writing by an organ of state or such person's duly authorised 
agent; or 
 (d) a service provider responsible for the provision of infrastructure, utilities 
or other related services.” 
SPLUMA (2013:1(1)) specifically defines land to include any real right in land – where 
the definition of land is “any erf, agricultural holding or farm portion, and includes any 
improvement or building on the land and any real right in land”. 
Any person holding a real right in land would therefore be able to apply for the 
corresponding development right in terms of SPLUMA, which should be granted if it 
falls within the vision of the SDF and no sound public objection against the specified 
use exists. 
A concept worth exploring arises if the definition of land is substituted into section 45 
(1)(c) of SPLUMA (2013): 
“A land development application may … be submitted by-” 
 “(c) a person to whom the land concerned [which is any erf, agricultural 
holding or farm portion, and includes any improvement or building on the 
land and any real right in land] has been made available for development in 
writing by an organ of state” 
Although it was most likely not the intent of the legislature to create such a mechanism, 
this interpretation might point to a mechanism for acquiring the right to develop land 
from the government, as opposed to a private owner of the land. Such a mechanism 
would be useful in overcoming ownership constraints to development when a 
landowner refuses to sell, or demands an unreasonable price for the land. The 
question arises whether the state could actually intervene so that land or real rights in 
land are obtained without having to negotiate with the landowner for it, but by rather 
applying to government for it. Such precedent exists in the mineral and mining rights 
legislation, which will be discussed below. 
4.2.3 Mineral rights – an example of acquiring development rights over 
another’s property from the state 
Mineral rights legislation offers an example of acquiring real rights in land by applying 
to the government, rather than negotiating with the owner of the land. In extreme 




land. The legislation that enables this acquisition of rights is accordingly discussed as 
part of the background information to the legal discourse. 
4.2.3.1 Obtaining mineral rights 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, number 28 of 2002, as last 
amended in 2008, has the purpose “To make provision for equitable access to and 
sustainable development of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources” (MPRDA, 
2008:preface). 
The act makes provision for parties to acquire real rights in land. These rights relate 
to the exploration for and the extraction of minerals and petroleum from the land, and 
the use of the land to facilitate such extraction. The act functions on the principle that 
“Mineral and petroleum resources are the common heritage of all the people of South 
Africa and the state is the custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans” 
(MPRDA, 2008:3(1)). The State, being the custodian of the nation's mineral and 
petroleum resources may according to the MPRDA (2008:3(2)(a)) “grant, issue, 
refuse, control, administer and manage any” rights in land that relate to prospecting 
for, mining of, exploration for and production of minerals and petroleum from the land. 
Such rights could include a prospecting right, a mining right, a mining permit, a 
retention permit, an exploration right, a production right, a reconnaissance permit or a 
technical co-operation permit (MPRDA, 2008). For the purpose of this discussion 
these rights will be referred to collectively as mineral rights. 
Such a right that is granted in terms of MPRDA and registered in terms of the Mining 
Titles Registration Act, No. 16 of 1967, as amended (2003) is “a limited real right in 
respect of the mineral or petroleum and the land to which such right relates” (MPRDA, 
2008:5(1)). 
According to MPRDA (2008:5(3)) the holders of such rights may: 
“(a) enter the land to which such right relates together with his or her 
employees, and bring onto that land any plant, machinery or equipment and 
build, construct or lay down any surface, underground or under sea 
infrastructure which may be required for the purpose of prospecting, mining, 
exploration or production, as the case may be; 
 (b) prospect, mine, explore or produce, as the case may be, for his or her 
own account on or under that land for the mineral or petroleum for which 




 (c) remove and dispose of any such mineral found during the course of 
prospecting, mining, exploration or production, as the case may be;… 
 (e) carry out any other activity incidental to prospecting, mining, exploration 
or production operations, which activity does not contravene the provisions 
of this Act.” 
The exercise of these mineral rights in land are prioritised over other surface rights – 
except for farming and land that has already been approved for township use by the 
minister of mineral affairs, as shown in MPRDA (2008:53): 
“53 Use of land surface rights contrary to objects of Act 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), any person who intends to use the surface of 
any land in any way which may be contrary to any object of this Act or which 
is likely to impede any such object must apply to the Minister for approval in 
the prescribed manner. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to- 
 (a) farming or any use incidental thereto; or 
 (b) the use of any land which lies within an approved town-planning scheme 
which has applied for and obtained approval in terms of subsection (1)” 
In cases where the owner or holder of other surface rights suffers or is likely to suffer 
loss because of the exercise of mineral rights, the afflicted and the mineral rights 
holder should negotiate for due compensation to the afflicted. In the literature review 
it was shown that a landowner would typically receive a small portion of the value of 
the minerals extracted as a royalty. Where parties however fail to reach a 
compensation agreement, the minister has the power to “expropriate any land or any 
right therein and pay compensation in respect thereof” (MPRDA, 2008:55(1)) in order 
to enable the utilisation of the mineral right. 
Because the MPRDA potentially provides for such a controversial application of 
property law, it is necessary to understand the objectives of the act and the context 
within which the act was passed. 
4.2.3.2 Objectives of the MPRDA 
The stated purpose of the MPRDA is “To make provision for equitable access to and 
sustainable development of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith” (MPRDA, 2008:preface). 
The act actively promotes equitable access to mineral resources. Anyone willing and 




not only the owner of land underneath which minerals are located. Applications are 
dealt with on a first-come-first-serve basis. Interested and affected persons have the 
ability to object to the granting of rights applied for. Assisting historically disadvantaged 
persons to conduct prospecting or mining operations is also promoted. 
The act furthermore promotes sustainable development of mineral resources. 
Development is promoted by enabling interested parties to acquire mineral rights in 
suitable land, provided that mineral rights are not already held in the land. It fosters an 
environment where developing the land to its highest and best use is not hampered 
by land owners or other surface right holders who wish to utilise the land in a less 
profitable manner. Sustainability is promoted by imposing strict economic, 
environmental and social obligations on holders of mineral rights. 
4.2.3.3 Background to the implementation of the MPRDA 
The need for equitable access to and sustainable development of South Africa’s 
mineral and petroleum resources was determined through an elaborate legislation 
review process. The white paper on mineral legislation discusses the review and 
recent reform of mineral rights in South Africa, which was necessary because of 
changes that have come about in the country. It states that South Africa’s mining 
industry is one of the cornerstones of its economy, warranting a review of the 
legislation in order to prepare for challenges, problems and opportunities confronting 
the industry (White paper: A minerals and mining policy for South Africa, 1998). 
The Mineral Policy Process Steering Committee was formed in 1995, mandated to 
“conduct an extensive consultative process to canvass stakeholder opinion for the 
preparation of a new minerals and mining policy for South Africa” (White paper: A 
minerals and mining policy for South Africa, 1998:2). The end result was a document 
with proposals on mineral policy, drafted after carefully considering a very broad range 
of views. This was edited into the Green Paper: Mineral Policy of South Africa - 3 
February 1998. Further consultation followed, and based on the responses a draft 
white paper was prepared. Further amendments were requested by the Cabinet 
Committee for Economic Affairs, after which Cabinet approved the document as the 
White Paper: a Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa on 23 September 1998. 
The White Paper has six main themes: Business Climate and Mineral Development, 




Management, Regional Co-operation, and Governance. Each chapter and subchapter 
contains general background information to the particular issue, a policy objective 
stating the legislative intent, the different stakeholders’ views and the Government’s 
policy statements. The Business Climate and Mineral Development chapter considers 
policy that is conducive to investment. It includes a section on Mineral Rights and 
Prospecting Information, presenting changes to the system of access to and mobility 
of mineral rights. The Participation in Ownership and Management chapter examines 
racial and other imbalances in the industry. The People Issues chapter considers 
issues such as health and safety, housing needs, migrant labour, industrial relations 
and downscaling. 
Based on the extensive findings of the white paper, the MPRDA was enacted, 
governed by the following principles (MPRDA, 2008:preamble): 
“RECOGNISING that minerals and petroleum are non-renewable natural 
resources; 
ACKNOWLEDGING that South Africa's mineral and petroleum resources 
belong to the nation and that the state is the custodian thereof; 
AFFIRMING the State's obligation to protect the environment for the benefit 
of present and future generations, to ensure ecologically sustainable 
development of mineral and petroleum resources and to promote economic 
and social development; 
RECOGNISING the need to promote local and rural development and the 
social upliftment of communities affected by mining; 
REAFFIRMING the State's commitment to reform to bring about equitable 
access to South Africa's mineral and petroleum resources; 
BEING COMMITTED to eradicating all forms of discriminatory practices in 
the mineral and petroleum industries; 
CONSIDERING the State's obligation under the Constitution to take 
legislative and other measures to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination; 
REAFFIRMING the State's commitment to guaranteeing security of tenure 
in respect of prospecting and mining operations; and 
EMPHASISING the need to create an internationally competitive and 




4.2.3.4 Enabling legal principles in mineral wealth legislation 
From the discussion above, one can identify legal principles that specifically 
collaborate to enable and promote the development of mineral resources. These 
principles can be summarised as: 
1. Development and utilisation of mineral wealth potential is desirable. 
2. Development and utilisation of mineral wealth potential is prioritised over other 
less profitable land uses. 
3. The state is custodian of mineral wealth, appropriating to interested parties the 
right to develop land for extracting mineral wealth. 
4. Land value maximisation is stimulated in that if a landowner does not apply for 
and utilise mineral rights, such rights may be obtained and exercised by a party 
other than the landowner. 
4.2.4 Comparing development of mineral and non-mineral land 
The abovementioned principles are clearly not presently applied in the development 
of non-mineral land. This is demonstrated in a comparison between the development 
of mineral rich land and the development of non-mineral land. Topics used for this 
comparison are the desirability of developing the land, how the rights to develop the 
land are obtained and how the right to develop the land ranks in terms of other rights 
that might be held in the land. 
4.2.4.1 Desirability of development 
Both the white paper and the MPRDA demonstrate that the development of mineral 
rights is desirable. Some of the stakeholder views reflecting desirability of 
development in the White Paper (1998), are:  
“The creation of wealth and employment is required for the economic 
empowerment of communities, both directly and through the multiplier 
effect. This is especially relevant in the underdeveloped regions of the 
country… 
New investors need opportunities for access to mineral rights… 
Equitable access to all natural resources is required, based on economic 
efficiency and sustainability.” 
Government accordingly responded to the desirability of development with policy 




environment conducive to economic growth and development, in which the mining 
industry can make effective use of its human and capital resources” and “Government 
will aim to lower barriers to entry to prospective new investors in the industry” (White 
paper: A minerals and mining policy for South Africa, 1998:1.4.1). This lead to the 
enactment of MPRDA in 2002, seeking “To make provision for equitable access to and 
sustainable development of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith” (MPRDA, 2008:preface). The desirability of 
development is evident, with the preamble of MPRDA (2008) also affirming “the State's 
obligation … to ensure ecologically sustainable development of mineral and petroleum 
resources and to promote economic and social development”. 
The objects of the Act also confirm the desirability of developing mineral and petroleum 
resources, which necessarily includes development of the land underneath which the 
resources are located (MPRDA, 2008:2): 
“The objects of this Act are to- 
(c) promote equitable access to the nation's mineral and petroleum 
resources to all the people of South Africa; 
(e) promote economic growth and mineral and petroleum resources 
development in the Republic, particularly development of downstream 
industries through provision of feedstock, and development of mining and 
petroleum inputs industries; 
(f) promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all 
South Africans” 
MPRDA (2008) goes so far as to prescribe in section 3 the development of mineral 
and petroleum resources – under the State’s custodianship thereof – for the benefit of 
all South Africans: 
“(3) The Minister must ensure the sustainable development of South Africa's 
mineral and petroleum resources within a framework of national 
environmental policy, norms and standards while promoting economic and 
social development.” 
A further demonstration of how desirable such development is, is the mandate that the 
minster is given to invite development applications where land is found to have 
potential, as reflected in section 49(4), section 73(1) and section 22(5) of MPRDA 
(2008): 
“(4) Subject to subsection (2) (b), the Minister may by notice in the Gazette 




respect of any mineral or land, and may specify in such notice the period 
within which any application may be lodged and the terms and conditions 
subject to which such right or permit may be granted.” 
“(1) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette invite applications for 
exploration and production rights in respect of any block or blocks, and may 
specify in such notice the period within which any application may be lodged 
with the designated agency and the terms and conditions subject to which 
such rights may be granted.” 
“(5) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette invite applications for mining 
rights in respect of any land, and may specify in such notice the period within 
which any application may be lodged and the terms and conditions subject 
to which such rights may be granted.” 
It is evident that development of mineral rich land is desirable, and that government 
has appropriately responded with applicable legislation. As with mineral rich land, it 
can be shown that developing non-mineral land resources is also desirable for South 
Africa. 
Developing non-mineral land is desirable because of its potential benefits for 
municipalities and for Value Capture programs. Vacant land can be utilised for urban 
renewal and revitalisation and can create municipal revenue (Brown-Luthango, 
Makanga & Smit, 2013). Development of land also offers opportunities for Value 
Capture, which has previously been shown to be desirable within the South African 
context. 
Certain passages of legislation also demonstrate the desirability of developing land 
resources, along with South Africa’s commitment thereto. 
SPLUMA (2013:8) states that “(1) The Minister must… prescribe norms and standards 
for land use management and land development” and “(2) The norms and standards 
must…(d) include… (iv) mechanisms for identifying strategically located vacant or 
under-utilised land and for providing access to and the use of such land”. 
Furthermore, the norms and standards prescribed by the minister must “reflect the 
national policy, national policy priorities and programmes relating to land use 
management and land development” (SPLUMA, 2013:8(2)(a)). Such national policies 
and priorities are: 
 Equitable access to land, reflected in Section 25 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, as amended (Constitution, 2012): “(5) The state 




resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on 
an equitable basis”. 
 Access to adequate housing, reflected in Section 26 of the Constitution (2012): 
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. (2) The state 
must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right”. 
 Redress, reflected in SPLUMA (2013:7(a)): “(i) past spatial and other 
development imbalances must be redressed through improved access to and 
use of land”. 
It is evident that South Africa is committed to making provision for equitable access to 
and sustainable development of the nation's land resources. The development of both 
mineral rich land and non-mineral land is shown to be desirable in South Africa. 
The state is empowered to provide equitable access to and sustainable development 
of mineral rich land. This is done in section 53 of MPRDA (2008), by effectively 
prohibiting the use of land surface in a manner that is contrary to the objects of the 
act: 
“(1) Subject to subsection (2), any person who intends to use the surface of 
any land in any way which may be contrary to any object of this Act or which 
is likely to impede any such object must apply to the Minister for approval in 
the prescribed manner. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to- 
 (a) farming or any use incidental thereto; or 
 (b) the use of any land which lies within an approved town-planning scheme 
which has applied for and obtained approval in terms of subsection (1); or 
 (c) any other use which the Minister may determine by notice in the Gazette. 
(3) Despite subsection (1), the Minister may cause an investigation to be 
conducted if it is alleged that a person intends to use the surface of any land 
in any way that could result in the mining of mineral resources being 
detrimentally affected.” 
The enactment of MPRDA made it impossible for an owner of mineral rich land to 
prevent his land from being developed to its highest and best use, which is the 
exploitation of minerals. This was confirmed by Judge Mogoeng, saying in Agri SA v 




and immediate effect of abolishing the entitlement to sterilise mineral rights, otherwise 
known as the entitlement not to sell or exploit minerals”. 
There is however an apparent lack of legislation that makes applicable provision for 
equitable access to and sustainable development of the nation's non-mineral land 
resources – especially in overcoming ownership constraints to land development.                       
4.2.4.2 Creation and control of rights 
MPRDA regards mineral resources as a national resource, stating that “South Africa's 
mineral and petroleum resources belong to the nation and … the state is the custodian 
thereof” (MPRDA, 2008:preamble). 
Section 3 of MPRDA (2008) deals with the custodianship of the nation's mineral and 
petroleum resources. It gives the state the authority to create mineral rights in land – 
rights that have not previously existed - by granting them: 
“(1) Mineral and petroleum resources are the common heritage of all the 
people of South Africa and the state is the custodian thereof for the benefit 
of all South Africans. 
(2) As the custodian of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources, the 
State, acting through the Minister, may- 
 (a) grant, issue, refuse, control, administer and manage any 
reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, permission to remove, 
mining right, mining permit, retention permit, technical co-operation permit, 
reconnaissance permit, exploration right and production right” 
The legal nature of these mineral rights and the rights of their holders are set out in 
section 5 of MPRDA (2008): 
“(1) A prospecting right, mining right, exploration right or production right 
granted in terms of this Act and registered in terms of the Mining Titles 
Registration Act, 1967, (Act 16 of 1967), is a limited real right in respect of 
the mineral or petroleum and the land to which such right relates.” 
Section 5 read together with section 3 effectively gives the state the ability to create – 
out of nothing – a limited real right in property. 
Applying for and obtaining mineral rights is not limited to landowners only. Application 
for rights on suitable land is open to anyone willing to comply with the requirements of 
MPRDA. Accordingly, the phrase “Any person who wishes to apply to the Minister for 
a … [right] must lodge the application…” is repeated throughout MPRDA for 




permit in section 27(2), reconnaissance permit in section 74(1), technical co-operation 
permit in section 76(1) and production right in section 83(1). 
This stimulates development of the mineral resources and promotes developing 
mineral rich land to its highest and best use – effectively bypassing ownership 
constraints to development and opening the land development market by removing 
barriers to entry. Government intervention in the case of the MPRDA has the effect of 
improving market efficiency in the market for mineral rich development land, by forcing 
landowners to develop the land to its highest and best use themselves or to dispose 
thereof to people willing to develop it.  
The landowner is able to object to mineral rights being granted, as stated in section 
10 of MPRDA (2008): 
 “(1) Within 14 days after accepting an application lodged in terms of section 
16, 22 or 27, the Regional Manager must in the prescribed manner- 
 (a) make known that an application for a prospecting right, mining right or 
mining permit has been accepted in respect of the land in question; and 
 (b) call upon interested and affected persons to submit their comments 
regarding the application within 30 days from the date of the notice. 
(2) If a person objects to the granting of a prospecting right, mining right or 
mining permit, the Regional Manager must refer the objection to the 
Regional Mining Development and Environmental Committee to consider 
the objections and to advise the Minister thereon.” 
The discretion in whether these objections are to prevail against granting mineral rights 
however lies with the minister – who is the only person with the capacity to prevent or 
restrict the granting of any mineral right. This capacity is granted in section 49 of 
MPRDA (2008): 
“(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Minister may after inviting representations 
from relevant stakeholders, from time to time by notice in the Gazette, 
having regard to the national interest, the strategic nature of the mineral in 
question and the need to promote the sustainable development of the 
nation's mineral resources- 
 (a) prohibit or restrict the granting of any reconnaissance permission, 
prospecting right, mining right or mining permit in respect of land identified 
by the Minister for such period and on such terms and conditions as the 
Minister may determine… 
(2) A notice contemplated in subsection (1) does not affect prospecting or 
mining in, on or under land which, on the date of the notice, is the subject of 
a reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, a mining right, a retention 




As the minister also has the task of promoting mineral exploitation, the owner would 
have no substantial means of preventing mineral rights from being granted. At most, 
the owner would have a claim for compensation for damages caused by the exercise 
of the mineral rights, after the rights have been granted. 
There is however no legislation in terms of which the state can create development 
rights over non-mineral land. SPLUMA regulates land development rights, but does 
not create or appropriate rights. It works simply by limiting the exercise of rights already 
held. When government approves land use rights and development rights in terms of 
SPLUMA, it permits the exercise of rights already held. 
Development and use rights for land are applied for by a person already holding the 
real right to use land, which includes (SPLUMA, 2013:45(1)):  
“(a) an owner, including the State, of the land concerned; 
 (b) a person acting as the duly authorised agent of the owner; 
 (c) a person to whom the land concerned has been made available for 
development in writing by an organ of state or such person's duly authorised 
agent; or 
 (d) a service provider responsible for the provision of infrastructure, utilities 
or other related services.” 
Despite government’s apparent policy intent to provide equitable access to land and 
to improve the use of underutilised land, there is currently no source of law that 
specifically aims to enable a developer to acquire the right to develop land to a higher 
and better use, if the owner of the land does not cede the right to the developer. 
The South African legal framework therefore seems to succeed in overcoming 
ownership constraint to the development of mineral rich land, but fails in overcoming 
ownership constraints that are in the way of developing non-mineral land to its highest 
and best use. 
4.2.4.3 Conflict of surface rights 
A third important principle contributing to the development of mineral rich land is that 
holders of mineral rights can enforce them over other surface rights. This principle was 
first established in Van Vuren and Others v Registrar of Deeds (South Africa, 




‘to go upon the property to which they relate to search for minerals, and, if he [the 
holder] finds any, to sever them and carry them away’”. 
Section 5 of MPRDA (2008) describes the legal nature of the rights created and 
granted by the act, and the rights of the holders thereof: 
 “(1) A prospecting right, mining right, exploration right or production right 
granted in terms of this Act and registered in terms of the Mining Titles 
Registration Act, 1967, (Act 16 of 1967), is a limited real right in respect of 
the mineral or petroleum and the land to which such right relates. 
 (2) The holder of a prospecting right, mining right, exploration right or 
production right is entitled to the rights referred to in this section and such 
other rights as may be granted to, acquired by or conferred upon such holder 
under this Act or any other law. 
(3) Subject to this Act, any holder of a prospecting right, a mining right, 
exploration right or production right may- 
 (a) enter the land to which such right relates together with his or her 
employees, and bring onto that land any plant, machinery or equipment and 
build, construct or lay down any surface, underground or under sea 
infrastructure which may be required for the purpose of prospecting, mining, 
exploration or production, as the case may be; 
 (b) prospect, mine, explore or produce, as the case may be, for his or her 
own account on or under that land for the mineral or petroleum for which 
such right has been granted; 
 (c) remove and dispose of any such mineral found during the course of 
prospecting, mining, exploration or production, as the case may be; 
(cA) subject to section 59B of the Diamonds Act, 1986 (Act 56 of 1986), (in 
the case of diamond) remove and dispose of any diamond found during the 
course of mining operations; 
 (d) subject to the National Water Act, 1998 (Act 36 of 1998), use water from 
any natural spring, lake, river or stream, situated on, or flowing through, such 
land or from any excavation previously made and used for prospecting, 
mining, exploration or production purposes, or sink a well or borehole 
required for use relating to prospecting, mining, exploration or production on 
such land; and 
 (e) carry out any other activity incidental to prospecting, mining, exploration 
or production operations, which activity does not contravene the provisions 






If any person tries to prevent the exercise of mineral rights, the holder of the mineral 
rights may apply to the state for assistance in enforcing the rights according to MPRDA 
(2008:54): 
“(1) The holder of a reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, mining 
right or mining permit must notify the relevant Regional Manager if that 
holder is prevented from commencing or conducting any reconnaissance, 
prospecting or mining operations because the owner or the lawful occupier 
of the land in question- 
 (a) refuses to allow such holder to enter the land; 
 (b) places unreasonable demands in return for access to the land; or 
 (c) cannot be found in order to apply for access. 
(2) The Regional Manager must, within 14 days from the date of the notice 
referred to in subsection (1)- 
 (a) call upon the owner or lawful occupier of the land to make 
representations regarding the issues raised by the holder of the 
reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, mining right or mining permit; 
 (b) inform that owner or occupier of the rights of the holder of a right, permit 
or permission in terms of this Act; 
 (c) set out the provisions of this Act which such owner or occupier is 
contravening; and 
 (d) inform that owner or occupier of the steps which may be taken, should 
he or she persist in contravening the provisions.” 
The owner or lawful occupier of the land therefore cannot prevent the creation or the 
exercise of mineral rights, but may nevertheless claim compensation for loss or 
damages caused by the exercise of the mineral rights according to MPRDA (2008:54): 
“(7) The owner or lawful occupier of land on which reconnaissance, 
prospecting or mining operations will be conducted must notify the relevant 
Regional Manager if that owner or occupier has suffered or is likely to suffer 
any loss or damage as a result of the prospecting or mining operation, in 
which case this section applies with the changes required by the context.” 
 “(3) If the Regional Manager, after having considered the issues raised by 
the holder under subsection (1) and any written representations by the 
owner or the lawful occupier of the land, concludes that the owner or 
occupier has suffered or is likely to suffer loss or damage as a result of the 
reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations, he or she must request 
the parties concerned to endeavour to reach an agreement for the payment 
of compensation for such loss or damage. 
(4) If the parties fail to reach an agreement, compensation must be 
determined by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1965 (Act 




MPRDA (2008:54) furthermore allows expropriation of the land in question, if no 
agreement can be reached with the landowner by which the holder of mineral rights 
can exercise his rights: 
“(5) If the Regional Manager, having considered the issues raised by the 
holder under subsection (1) and any representations by the owner or 
occupier of land and any written recommendation by the Regional Mining 
Development and Environmental Committee, concludes that any further 
negotiation may detrimentally affect the objects of this Act referred to in 
section 2 (c), (d), (f) or (g), the Regional Manager may recommend to the 
Minister that such land be expropriated in terms of section 55.” 
Such expropriation may be conducted by the Minister of Minerals and Energy in terms 
of section 55 of MPRDA (2008): 
“(1) If it is necessary for the achievement of the objects referred to in section 
2 (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) the Minister may, in accordance with section 25 (2) 
and (3) of the Constitution, expropriate any land or any right therein and pay 
compensation in respect thereof. 
(2) (a) Sections 6, 7 and 9 (1) of the Expropriation Act, 1975 (Act 63 of 1975), 
apply to any expropriation in terms of this Act.” 
 
Section 25 (2) and (3) of the Constitution (2012), which is referred to above, pertains 
to expropriation, and states that: 
“(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application- 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner 
of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided 
or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment 
must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the 
public interest and the interests of those affected…” 
Section 6 of the Expropriation Act referred to above (Expropriation Act, No. 63 of 1975, 
as amended, 1994) relates to the inspection of property for purposes of expropriation. 
Section 7 thereof relates to the notification that the property is to be expropriated. 
Section 9(1) thereof relates to the duty of the landowner to supply a written statement 
in response to the expropriation and the land in question. 
A new bill for expropriation has been presented to parliament in 2015, but has not yet 




discourse, regardless of whether the existing act is used or whether the new bill comes 
into power. 
Regarding non-mineral land with development potential, SPLUMA (2013) regulates 
who may apply for a land development application, but no reference is made to any 
conflicting surface rights or ranking of rights. It is simply implied that the real right or 
limited real right to use land must already be held by a person, in order for him or his 
agent to apply for permission to use the land in accordance with the rights. Besides 
when an owner cedes or grants a right to a developer, there is no way to acquire a 
right that ranks higher than existing surface use rights for non-mineral land.  
4.2.4.4 Comparative conclusion 
The existence of mineral and petroleum deposits under land fosters a profitable and 
desirable highest and best use of the land, i.e. the mining and extraction of these 
minerals. MPRDA (2008) recognises that the wealth potential that mineral deposits 
afford is not created by any person, but that it is a national inheritance which is 
controlled by the state for the benefit of all South Africans. MPRDA (2008) stimulates 
and regulates developing land with mineral deposits to this highest and best use, for 
the benefit of all South Africans. It effectively overcomes ownership constraints to the 
development of mineral rich land. 
South African legislation however does not presently regard the potential wealth 
inherent to other types of property development as a resource to be managed for the 
benefit of the nation. This should however be reconsidered, because development of 
non-mineral land could also benefit the nation – especially from a perspective of 
financing public infrastructure through Value Capture. 
The development potential of non-mineral land could be regarded as a national 
resource, since it is not specifically created by any person. It is mostly public factors 
that afford any land its potential for higher and better use. Public infrastructure creates 
amenity and access for land parcels. Market demand for higher and better land use in 
an area is brought about by such access and amenity. Furthermore land use rights, 
as contemplated in SPLUMA (2013), become useable because society favours using 
land in certain areas in certain ways – as shown in the Spatial Development 
Framework – and because land use rights are approved or prohibited by the state, 




the person controlling the land may elect to act thereupon and create value by 
developing the land.  
Therefore – whether it be mineral deposits under a land parcel that foster potential for 
mining related development, or a concentration of people and infrastructure near a 
land parcel that fosters potential for residential, retail or office related development – 
the potential was not created by the landowner. Potential is simply acted upon. There 
is therefore an argument to treat land development potential as a national resource, 
which should be managed for the benefit of all South Africans – as is demonstrated 
by the mineral and petroleum resources legislation. 
In the context of Value Capture, the study therefore proposes treating land 
development potential as a national resource that should be capitalised upon. The 
study accordingly seeks to overcome ownership constraints to development, which 
would imply that any party interested and willing to comply with legislation can obtain 
a land development right over land – provided that no such right is already held or has 
been applied for. 
Treating non-mineral land in the same way as mineral rich land might also be justified 
by demonstrating that government desires equitable access and sustainable 
development of both mineral and non-mineral land. 
4.2.5 National policy on property development wealth  
The existing mineral legislation was enacted with the overarching purpose “To make 
provision for equitable access to and sustainable development of the nation's mineral 
and petroleum resources; and to provide for matters connected therewith” (MPRDA, 
2008:preface). As discussed on the previous section, the act realises this purpose by 
providing applicable mechanisms for overcoming ownership constraints.  
There is however no clear cut application in sources of law for overcoming ownership 
constraints to non-mineral land with development potential. The study however 
proposes implementing such applications, because an examination of existing policy 
clearly demonstrates the intent to promote sustainable development of land in general, 
as well as the intent to promote equitable access to land with development potential. 





The preamble of SPLUMA (2013) sets the scene for eradicating places defined and 
influenced by previous laws that promoted unsustainable settlement patterns. The 
preamble of SPLUMA (2013) furthermore expands on Section 26 of the Constitution 
(2012) which reads “(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing” 
by stating that adequate housing includes “an equitable spatial pattern and sustainable 
human settlements”. 
According to section 8 of SPLUMA (2013) the minister must prescribe norms and 
standards for land use management and land development that “(b) promote social 
inclusion, spatial equity, desirable settlement patterns, rural revitalisation, urban 
regeneration and sustainable development”. 
Sustainable development according to the preamble of SPLUMA (2013) requires “the 
integration of social, economic and environmental considerations in both forward 
planning and ongoing land use management to ensure that development of land 
serves present and future generations”. 
SPLUMA (2013:3) states the objects of the act, where one of the objects is to “(d) 
provide for the sustainable and efficient use of land”. The act furthermore sets out 
general principles in chapter 2 that guide amongst others “(c) the sustainable use and 
development of land” (SPLUMA, 2013:6(1)). 
The principle of Spatial Sustainability is furthermore applicable to spatial planning, land 
development and land use management according to section 7 of SPLUMA (2013). 
It can accordingly be concluded that policy does have the intent to promote 
sustainability in the use of land resources. 
4.2.5.2 Importance of development 
Another principle that applies to spatial planning, land development and land use 
management according to section 7 of SPLUMA (2013) is “(c) the principle of 
efficiency, whereby- (i) land development optimises the use of existing resources and 
infrastructure”. This corresponds with the notion of developing land to its highest and 





Section 8 of SPLUMA (2013) mandates the Minister to make provisions for identifying 
and developing land that is not developed to its highest and best use: 
“(1) The Minister must… prescribe norms and standards for land use 
management and land development… 
(2) The norms and standards must… (d) include… (iv) mechanisms for 
identifying strategically located vacant or under-utilised land and for 
providing access to and the use of such land” 
Furthermore, another principle that propagates improving access to and use of land – 
in other words developing land to higher and better use – is the principle of Spatial 
Justice (SPLUMA, 2013:7): 
“(a) The principle of spatial justice, whereby- 
(i) past spatial and other development imbalances must be redressed 
through improved access to and use of land” 
Based on the obvious policy intent of existing legislation – and the benefits that might 
be realised through Value Capture programmes when land is developed to its highest 
and best use – it is concluded that developing land to its highest potential is desirable 
within the South African context. 
4.2.5.3 Equitable access 
Section 25 of the Constitution (2012) makes provision for the state to implement 
legislative and other measures that will improve access to land: 
“(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain 
access to land on an equitable basis.” 
In the preamble of SPLUMA (2013) “the State's obligation to realise the constitutional 
imperatives” is recognised as a reason for the act, recognising a need for “measures 
designed to foster conditions that enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis”. 
It is evident that equitable access to land, as well as the sustainable development of 
land is important to South Africa. This broadly includes all land with potential to be 
developed to higher and better use – not only land with development potential because 




4.2.6 Conclusion of background facts and legal doctrines 
Land use is regulated by government in South Africa. It is evident that developing land 
to its potential is a matter of national importance. Land should be developed 
sustainably, and people should be provided with equitable access to land resources. 
Ownership constraints to development should therefore be overcome. 
The MPRDA provides a successful mechanism for overcoming ownership constraints 
to developing mineral rich land to its highest and best use. There is however still a 
need for overcoming ownership constraints to developing non-mineral land to its 
highest and best use. 
4.3 Legal discourse – step three: Proof for the thesis claim 
Having stated relevant background facts and legal doctrines, this discourse will now 
set forth in constructing proof of, and support for the thesis claim: “The development 
promoting principles found in mineral rights legislation can be applied to non-mineral 
land, which enables developers to develop land without being constrained by 
landownership”. Realistic hypotheticals and concrete examples from real cases will be 
provided to demonstrate theoretical arguments. 
The discourse demonstrates how the enabling principles found in mineral rights 
legislation might be applied to enable a developer to legally acquire land for 
development, when the landowner refuses to sell or demands an unreasonable price. 
A doctrine is developed by verbally manipulating legal rules – using deductive, 
analogical and inductive reasoning, as described in the methodology chapter of this 
study.  A hypothetical case is developed to demonstrate how expropriation for the 
purpose of maximising land value could be constitutionally justified, within the context 
of Value Capture and other national land priorities. 
4.3.1 Application for overcoming ownership constraints 
The application found in MPRDA effectively creates a system where a developer 
interested in developing mineral rich land to its highest and best use may apply to 
government for the right to do so. Government then grants – and effectively creates – 
a real right in property to the developer. This real right supersedes other surface use 




There is however no law besides MPRDA by which the government can create a 
development right in land, that supersedes surface rights held by the owner. The 
statement “(c) a person to whom the land concerned has been made available for 
development in writing by an organ of state” in Section 45 of SPLUMA (2013), gives 
the wrought impression that a developer interested in developing non-mineral land can 
apply for such rights to government, rather than obtaining the rights from the 
landowner. Government however is not able to create and grant development rights – 
besides mineral rights – that supersede surface rights held by the landowner. 
In order for the state to make non-mineral land available for development in writing to 
a developer, the state would have to pass surface use rights on to the developer. This 
requires that the state first acquires the right, or already holds the right. Without first 
obtaining the surface use rights, the state would not be able to make land “available 
for development in writing” (SPLUMA, 2013:45(1)), because the owner of the land 
would still hold the dominium right, which is able to prevent the developer from entering 
onto the land and using the land. The state would have to own, purchase or expropriate 
the land, or any surface use rights that might supersede development rights, if it wants 
to make land available for development to a developer. 
4.3.2 Expropriation 
As discussed in the literature review, government intervention in the form of 
compulsory land acquisition might be required to overcome ownership constraints and 
enable developers to develop land to its highest and best use value. In South Africa it 
is called expropriation when the government compulsorily acquires land for public 
purpose use.  
In Kelo v New London (United States of America, 2005) the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut, USA ruled that land may be compulsory acquired by the state on behalf 
of a private developer, provided that the development demonstrated to be of Public 
Use. Similar application might be possible in South African law, even though it has 
never been attempted yet. 
Section 25 of the Constitution of South Africa (2012) makes provision for expropriation 
of land for public purposes: 




 (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
 (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner 
of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided 
or approved by a court… 
(4) For the purposes of this section- 
 (a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and 
to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural 
resources; and 
 (b) property is not limited to land.” 
Section 2 of the Expropriation Act (1994) gives the Minister of Public works the right 
to expropriate property for public and certain other purposes: 
”(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act the Minister may, subject to an 
obligation to pay compensation, expropriate any property for public 
purposes or take the right to use temporarily any property for public 
purposes.” 
If a developer is able to demonstrate that his intended development on land is in the 
public interest, he might be able to apply to the minister to expropriate the land for him 
– assuming that the owner of the land either refuses to sell, or demands a price above 
the market price of the property. In accordance with the wrought reading of section 
45(c) of SPLUMA mentioned earlier, the land can then be made available for 
development in writing by the state. This would necessarily imply that a type of public-
private initiative be followed whereby the state maintains ownership of the land and 
the developer develops the land – or the land can simply be sold or granted to the 
developer once it has been expropriated. 
The Expropriation Act does not compel the minister to expropriate, which implies that 
the public purpose should be so clearly evident that it convinces the minster of the 
need to expropriate. 
The study will now present a hypothetical development project case that caters for 
Value Capture and other public purposes, which might be able to convince the minister 
to expropriate the land for public purposes. Assumptions for such a case are: 
- The owner refuses to sell the land to a developer, or demands a price that 




- Re-zoning (amendment of the land use scheme according to SPLUMA) is 
required for realising the development potential that the developer envisions in 
the land. 
- The owner of the land has not submitted a re-zoning application, and pays tax 
on the current use value of the property. 
This case will argue how land might be expropriated at a value which is lower than the 
residual value that could be realised if the land were re-zoned and developed 
according to its new zoning rights. The difference between the compensation paid for 
the expropriation, and the residual value that is eventually realised, might be available 
for capturing in Value Capture.  
4.3.2.1 Compensation under expropriation 
When land is expropriated, the convention is to pay the market value of land plus 
actual financial damages in accordance with the Expropriation Act (1994:12): 
“12 Basis on which compensation is to be determined:  
(1) The amount of compensation to be paid in terms of this Act to an owner 
in respect of property expropriated in terms of this Act, or in respect of the 
taking, in terms of this Act, of a right to use property, shall not, subject to the 
provisions of subsection (2), exceed- 
 (a) in the case of any property other than a right, excepting a registered 
right to minerals, the aggregate of- 
 (i) the amount which the property would have realized if sold on the date of 
notice in the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer; and 
 (ii) an amount to make good any actual financial loss caused by the 
expropriation” 
A landowner would typically argue that the value of the expropriated land should be 
the residual land value realisable if the land were developed to its most profitable 
potential, rather than the value of its current use, as the prior is expected to be higher 
than the latter. 
Value Capture theory however states that if the owner were to receive such residual 
value, and not the current use value, he would receive a public windfall benefit that he 
did not create (Smith & Gihring, 2006). The owner is unlikely to lose any of his original 
capital investment in the land, should he receive the full current use value but not the 




Furthermore, if land could be acquired for development at a value that is lower than 
the residual land value that a developer might realise on the land, the difference in 
value should be available for capture through Value Capture programs. 
In expropriation so far, the convention has been for the landowner to receive the 
residual land value that might be realised on the land, had it been developed to its 
highest potentiality. There are however arguments that support the notion that a 
landowner of expropriated land should not receive the residual land value of the use 
to which a developer might potentially put it, if re-zoning in terms of SPLUMA is 
required to realise that potential. These arguments are accordingly provided. 
4.3.2.2 Burden to prove that potentiality will be taken into account by a 
buyer 
If the owner of expropriated land wants to claim compensation for any potential of the 
property, he must prove that the potential exists, as judged in Town Board of Port 
Edward v Kay (South Africa, 1997:23-26) and Loubser en andere v Suid-Afrikaanse 
Spoorweë en Hawens (South Africa, 1976:608G–615F). In such a case, potential of 
land was defined in Town Board of Port Edward v Kay (South Africa, 1997:25) as “a 
use, additional to its current use, for which the property is suited and reasonably 
capable of being put in the future” – with reference to the cases of South African 
Railways v New Silverton Estate Ltd (South Africa, 1946) and Thanam NO v Minister 
of Lands (South Africa, 1970). 
It was furthermore judged in Town Board of Port Edward v Kay (South Africa, 1997) 
that the party that relies on the potential in setting the value may select the possibility 
that is most advantageous to him as the highest and best use of the property, as long 
as both the typical buyer and seller would have considered the use in their price 
negotiations. It was nevertheless highlighted in Davis and another v Pietermaritzburg 
City Council (South Africa, 1989) that such potentiality is not yet a reality and remains 
at best a bargaining chip in the theoretical negotiations between a willing buyer and 





In Town Board of Port Edward v Kay (South Africa, 1997:25-26) it was set out that 
there are three components to proving the existence of potential: 
- a) The potential must exist and must be shown as a reasonable possibility, as 
demonstrated in Minister of Water Affairs v Mostert (South Africa, 1966), 
Jacobs v Minister of Agriculture (South Africa, 1972) and in Bestuursraad van 
Sebokeng v M & K Trust & Finansiële Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk (South Africa, 
1973). 
- b) A willing buyer and seller should take the potential into account in fixing the 
price, which must be proved on a balance of probabilities – as demonstrated in 
Thanam NO v Minister of Lands (South Africa, 1970) and in Bonnet v 
Department of Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure (South Africa, 1974). 
- c) The quantum, upon which Loubser en andere v Suid-Afrikaanse Spoorweë 
en Hawens (South Africa, 1976) determined that there is no onus in the narrow 
sense, once components (a) and (b) have been conceded or established. 
The second component of proving potential involves proving that a willing buyer must 
take the potential into account in fixing the price. A willing buyer is likely to consider 
the potential of a property, but will also consider the risk and likeliness of obtaining 
appropriate zoning when considering what use the property should be put to. 
It was said in Minister of Agriculture v Estate Randeree and Others (South Africa, 
1979b:219) that: 
“an open market and a plurality of buyers demands that in determining 
compensation regard must be had, inter alia, to what potential buyers would 
consider to be the prospects of obtaining a special consent or a re-zoning”. 
It was furthermore said in Davey v Minister of Agriculture (South Africa, 1979a:113) 
that: 
“A prospective buyer will normally have an eye to the potential of property 
he is considering buying but will be circumspect and conservative in 
attaching value to it for a number of reasons: In the nature of things the 
potential is not a reality and it follows that there may be risks, foreseen or 
unforeseen, attendant upon its development” 
While restrictions on land must be considered when determining its potential, the 
chance that these restrictions might be discharged should also be kept in mind, as 
was judged in the cases of Dutch Reformed Church v town Council of Cape Town 




(South Africa, 1965), Minister of Water Affairs v Mostert (South Africa, 1966), 
Bestuursraad van Sebokeng v M & K Trust & Finansiële Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk 
(South Africa, 1973) and in Southern Tvl Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City 
Council (South Africa, 1979c). 
A developer however might be especially cautious of paying for development potential 
if realising such development potential would require amendment of the land use 
management scheme in terms of the recently enacted SPLUMA. Changing the use of 
the land could easily be prevented by society raising objections against such use 
change, during the public participation process which is required by SPLUMA before 
re-zoning is approved. 
Because of the risk, prudent developers enter into purchase agreements on 
development land, subject to them obtaining appropriate zoning permission on the 
land. This type of agreement is effectively an option and obligation to buy the land if 
the legal characteristics and potential of the land change. Specific reference is made 
to suspensive conditions, as the sale in a contract with a suspensive condition is only 
effective once the condition is fulfilled; no sale is enforceable in terms thereof on the 
land and situation as it is now. For the purpose of expropriation, the value of the land 
is “the amount which the property would have realized if sold on the date of notice in 
the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer” (Expropriation Act, 
1994:12(1)(a)(i)). The definition refers to a sale, and not to an option to buy land if the 
nature and legal characteristics of the land significantly changes. The conclusion is 
therefore that since the enactment of SPLUMA, a buyer should reasonably be willing 
to conclude a purchase agreement without any suspensive conditions only for a value 
that can be realised in terms of the land’s current use zoning – as that is the only 
certain legally permissible use. A buyer is not likely to conclude an enforceable 
purchase at a price higher than the residual land value for property’s best use in terms 
of its existing zoning rights. 
The compensable land value in expropriation, which is “the amount which the property 
would have realized if sold on the date of notice in the open market by a willing seller 
to a willing buyer” (Expropriation Act, 1994:12(1)(a)(i)), is therefore unlikely to be 




This supports the argument that re-zoning potential on land can no longer be taken 
into account when determining the compensation payable under expropriation. 
4.3.2.3 Re-zoning constitutes development 
Another argument favouring such an approach arises from the definition of land 
development, which was recently enacted in terms of SPLUMA. Re-zoning constitutes 
acquiring a change of approved land use on the land use scheme, which is considered 
to be land development in terms of SPLUMA (2013:1(1)):  
“'land development' means the erection of buildings or structures on land, or 
the change of use of land, including township establishment, the subdivision 
or consolidation of land or any deviation from the land use or uses permitted 
in terms of an applicable land use scheme” 
In Davis and another v Pietermaritzburg City Council (South Africa, 1989) it is 
established that in expropriation cases where the value of the land is contested, it is 
land with its then existing potentialities that is to be valued – and not the value of what 
the land would be once the potentialities have been realised by development: 
“But it is the property as it is on the date of notice, with its potentialities, that 
must be valued; the property must not be valued as though the potentiality 
had been realized and the development taken place (see Southern 
Transvaal Buildings case, supra; cf Lochner v Afdelingsraad, Stellenbosch 
1976 (4) SA 737 (c), at p 744 B - F).” 
The convention so far has been that the landowner would receive the residual land 
value of what might reasonably be developed on the land, even if such a development 
required re-zoning of the land. 
SPLUMA however distinctively defines that the change of the use of land – which is 
synonymous with re-zoning the land – is to be grouped as development. In terms of 
SPLUMA’s definition of development, read together with the judgement in Davis and 
another v Pietermaritzburg City Council (South Africa, 1989), there are grounds to 
ignore any potential in land that would require re-zoning, when determining the 
compensation payable in expropriation. Since expropriated land value should be 
determined “as it is on the date of notice, with its potentialities”, and “must not be 
valued as though the potentiality had been realized and the development taken place”, 
it could be interpreted that land should be valued according to its presently approved 
land use, and not as if development – which includes applying for and obtaining re-




This is however a highly controversial application of the law, which was most likely not 
foreseen when SPLUMA was drafted. Nevertheless the loophole for such application 
was opened by SPLUMA, and remains to be challenged in court. 
If a landowner is not able to claim re-zoning development potentiality as part of the 
land value, he might try to claim for “an amount to make good any actual financial loss 
caused by the expropriation” (Expropriation Act, 1994:12(1)(a)(ii)). 
The owner might however fail with such a claim, as it would constitute a claim for the 
loss of the potential profits from development – taking into account that re-zoning is 
now classified as development by SPLUMA. In expropriation, the owner of the land 
receives the value of the land in question, and not the profits that could be realised by 
a potential development, as was judged in Kangra Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Water Affairs (South Africa, 1998:28): 
“What the owners were entitled to, therefore, was the market value of the 
property as it was at date of expropriation, not to the benefits flowing from 
what it would have become later.” 
In Davis and another v Pietermaritzburg City Council (South Africa, 1989:382) this 
principle was also demonstrated in judging about a claim for loss of profit that would 
have been realised had development taken place: 
“it would mean in effect that in such a case the owner of the property 
expropriated would be compensated not for the market value of the property 
on the date of the notice of expropriation with its then-existing potentiality 
for development, but for the present value of what would have accrued to 
him had the potential been realised and the development carried out. This 
seems to me to be contrary to principle and likely to lead to anomalies which 
could not have been intended by the Legislature.” 
The comment confirms that the market value of the property should be paid, but since 
the enactment of SPLUMA there are grounds to disregard potentiality that requires re-
zoning (development) when determining the market value – which remains to be 
challenged in court, as discussed in the previous two sub-sections. What is however 
of relevance here is the fact that forfeiting development (which now could include re-
zoning) profit because of expropriation, constitutes an indirect financial loss. Such loss 
is not compensable in terms of the Expropriation Act (1994:12(5)(e)): 
“(e) no allowance shall be made for any unregistered right in respect of any 
other property or for any indirect damage or anything done with the object 




An example of such a judgement is the case of Kangra Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Water Affairs (South Africa, 1998:28): 
“the award of the additional amount claimed would, in effect, have afforded 
the owners the benefits they would have enjoyed had the property, as at 
date of expropriation, been finally developed. What the owners were entitled 
to, therefore, was the market value of the property as it was at date of 
expropriation, not to the benefits flowing from what it would have become 
later.” 
The judge further added that the owner could neither claim the increase on market 
value of the land, nor the profits realised if development of the land were to take place 
in Kangra Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Water Affairs (South Africa, 1998:28-29): 
“Just as the owners could not have claimed the sum by which the market 
value of the property would have increased had development taken place, 
so must it be equally plain that they could not get the profits it was alleged 
they would have earned had development taken place” 
This statement implies that one cannot claim for an increase in market value caused 
by development. If the SPLUMA definition of development holds, this statement would 
imply that neither a claim for increased market value because of re-zoning, nor a claim 
for financial loss because re-zoning was prevented, should succeed.  
On appeal, the judge in Kangra Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Water Affairs (South 
Africa, 1998:233) confirmed that if expropriation prevents potential future 
development, not receiving potential future development profits does indeed constitute 
an indirect loss: 
“The loss for which appellant claims was not caused directly by the 
expropriation. It was not caused by the loss of the coal rights. It was caused 
by non-exploitation of those rights. As in the cases of Pienaar and Davis, 
before the profits in question could have been earned appellant would have 
had to take a series of steps to establish its income-producing structure. 
Those steps were all links in the chain of causation of the loss and they had 
nothing to do with the expropriation. One may test it this way. Had 
expropriation not occurred and had appellant retained the rights for another 
say ten or fifteen years before disposing of them without having done any 
more about coal mining than it had by the time of expropriation, its loss, or, 
more accurately, the financial expression of its non-realisation of profits, 
would have been exactly the same as the loss it now claims. The loss 
claimed was at best only an indirect result of the expropriation and, on the 
statutory interpretation stated above, not compensable.” 
These above judgements clearly distinguish between land that is already developed 
and land that is not developed, when determining the market value of the land. In 




made between whether development had already been realised at the time of 
expropriation, or not. If the SPLUMA definition of development – which includes re-
zoning – holds, it would necessarily imply that distinction should also be made 
between whether the land had already been re-zoned or not.  
SPLUMA (2013:1(1)) clearly classifies re-zoning of land as land development. Since 
the enactment of SPLUMA, there are grounds to argue that land potentiality which 
would require re-zoning (development) must be disregarded when expropriating, 
whether such value might be realised in the market value of the land, or whether it is 
in the potential profits that re-zoning might have brought about. This approach 
contrasts with how cases were treated before the enactment of SPLUMA, where the 
convection was to compensate for potentiality even if it required re-zoning. 
4.3.2.4 Disregard for value enhanced by illegal use of land 
Besides the arguments stated above, the law might even require that certain 
potentialities of land be ignored altogether when determining the value of a property. 
Section 12 (5) of the Expropriation Act (1994) determines the basis on which 
compensation is to be determined in the case of an expropriation – providing for certain 
value enhancement that shall not be taken account of: 
“(5) In determining the amount of compensation to be paid in terms of this 
Act, the following rules shall apply, namely- 
(c) if the value of the property has been enhanced in consequence of the 
use thereof in a manner which is unlawful, such enhancement shall not be 
taken into account” 
Section 26 of SPLUMA (2013) states that: 
“(2) Land may be used only for the purposes permitted- 
 (a) by a land use scheme” 
Section 58 of SPLUMA (2013) furthermore states that: 
“(1) A person is guilty of an offence if that person- 
(b) uses land contrary to a permitted land use as contemplated in section 26 
(2); 
(c) alters the form and function of land without prior approval in terms of this 




It might therefore be argued that contenting to receive the residual value of a 
development in a different land use zoning than that which is currently approved, 
rather than the current use value, would constitute claiming for a value enhancement 
“in consequence of the use thereof in a manner which is unlawful”. 
Supporting such argument is the definition of highest and best use. Highest and best 
use is defied by the Appraisal Institute (2008:278) as “the reasonably probable and 
legal use of vacant land or an improved property that is legally permissible, physically 
possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest 
value”. The International Valuation Standards Council (2015) define it in their online 
glossary as “The use of an asset that maximises its potential and that is physically 
possible, legally permissible and financially feasible”. Where no development rights 
exist (where re-zoning to a higher use has not yet been applied for and approved) the 
highest and best use must evidently fall within the existing zoning – because any use 
not yet approved in terms of SPLUMA constitutes an illegal use of land. 
4.3.2.5 Disregard for improvements after expropriation date 
A further rule in terms of the Expropriation Act (1994:12(5)) that applies in determining 
the amount of compensation to be paid when expropriating, is: 
“(d) improvements made after the date of notice on or to the property in 
question (except where they were necessary for the proper maintenance of 
existing improvements or where they were undertaken in pursuance of 
obligations entered into before that date) shall not be taken into account” 
According to this rule, acquiring re-zoning – which is classified by the act as land 
development, and hence would be an improvement made on or to the property – 
should not be taken into account if is done after the date of expropriation notice. This 
supports the argument that a landowner cannot claim the residual land value that 
might be realised by a development that would require re-zoning. In terms of this 
argument any land value attributed to the land’s potentiality would have to be possible 
within the existing zoning, as it is recorded in the land use management scheme at the 





4.3.2.6 Disregard for value in terms of the purpose for which land is taken  
The Expropriation Act (1994:12(5)) provides a further rule in determining the amount 
of compensation to be paid when expropriating: 
“(f) any enhancement or depreciation, before or after the date of notice, in 
the value of the property in question, which may be due to the purpose for 
which or in connection with which the property is being expropriated or is to 
be used, or which is a consequence of any work or act which the state may 
carry out or perform or already has carried out or performed or intends to 
carry out or perform in connection with such purpose, shall not be taken into 
account” 
Omitting some of the alternative phrases offered by this rule, it reads that “any 
enhancement… in the value of the property… which may be due to the purpose for 
which… the property… is to be used… shall not be taken into account”. 
This rule opens a loophole that the legislature most likely never considered.  Should 
the Minister expropriate land for the purpose of re-zoning it to another use and 
constructing buildings in terms of this newly approved use, the value attributed to using 
the land in such a way should not be taken into account, according to this rule. It might 
therefore imply that if land is taken for re-zoning and consequent development, the 
value that can be realised by re-zoning and consequent development should be 
disregarded when expropriating. This implies that land might be expropriated at a 
valuation lower than its most profitable potential value, provided that the land 
expropriated is to be re-zoned to a higher land use in order to realise the potential, 
and that the land is taken for such purpose. The legislature most likely never 
considered expropriating land for re-zoning and consequent development when the 
Expropriation Act was drafted, but the loophole was nevertheless opened. 
4.3.2.6.1 Disregard value which is a consequence of an act of the state 
Rule (f) of the Expropriation Act (1994:12(5)) could also be read as “any 
enhancement… in the value of the property… which is a consequence of any… act 
which the state may carry out or perform… in connection with such purpose, shall not 
be taken into account”. 
Reviewing applications for, and granting higher land use rights and development rights 
can be considered to be “act[s] which the state may carry out or perform”. If that holds, 




development rights that the state must still review or grant, cannot be taken into 
account when determining the amount of compensation to be paid in terms of the 
expropriation act. This would also then imply that any potentiality of land that requires 
re-zoning should be disregarded when determining compensation for expropriation. 
Again, the legislature most likely never considered such application of the rule, but the 
loophole does exist for potential application. 
4.3.2.7 Conclusion on determining compensation for expropriated land 
When the arguments above are combined into one case, they support the notion that 
if land is acquired by expropriation for the purpose of developing it to a specific higher 
land use zoning, the compensation that the landowner receives can be no higher than 
the best value realisable in terms of its existing land use zoning. 
Such conclusion would imply that land might be expropriated at a value which is lower 
than the residual land value of what the property will be developed to in future. The 
difference between the compensation paid for the expropriation and the residual land 
value realised through a re-zoning development should then be available for 
distribution between the parties or potential capture by Value Capture programs. 
4.4 Legal Discourse – step four: Deriving a useful solution to the problem 
statement 
An aspect of the argument not addressed yet, is that the minster of land affairs has no 
obligation to expropriate land for re-zoning and development. The public purpose of 
such an expropriation should be demonstrated in order to convince the minister to 
expropriate the land. 
4.4.1 Value Capture as a public purpose 
One public purpose aspect of an expropriation for re-zoning development would come 
from the potential that such a case would create for Value Capture. Acquiring 
development land at a price (compensation payable in terms of the expropriation) that 
is lower than the residual land value of the envisioned development, creates an 
increment of value that does not accrue to any specific party. This increment might be 





If a developer presents a re-zoning development plan to the government, pledging the 
incremental land value to the state, he might be able to obtain the land by means of 
expropriation, if the landowner refuses to sell or demands an unreasonable price for 
the land. 
Expropriating land for development at a value lower than the residual land value which 
will be realised does not only seem to be possible, but might even be justifiable in the 
South African context. 
As stated in the assumptions of the hypothetical case, the owner in such a case paid 
property tax on the present use value, and not on any higher residual land value that 
could be realised by a developer. It would be just as unfair for an owner to receive the 
residual land value of the land’s highest and best use without having paid tax on that 
land value, as it would have been for the owner to pay tax on the highest and best use 
land value without the land being developed to that value. 
The owner in the hypothetical case also demonstrated no interest in realising the 
higher potential value by applying for such use rights. Furthermore, it is mostly public 
factors that afford a land parcel its higher and better use: Public infrastructure that 
affords amenity and access to a land parcel, the market demand for a higher and better 
use, as well as use rights granted by the state – who acts on behalf of society. As 
such, for the landowner to receive a significant part of the profits realisable by a 
developer on the land could be deemed inequitable, as he would be receiving a 
windfall benefit that he did not create. 
The owner of the land in this hypothetical case typically did nothing more than another 
person whose land is located in a different part of town, where land is not as well 
served by infrastructure, and which falls in areas not intended for development on a 
Spatial Development Framework. Accordingly there is an argument to be made that 
land value increases realised when land is developed by a developer should not 
accrue to the landowner, but might rather be captured by the state in Value Capture 
programmes.  
According to the arguments presented, it might be justifiable and possible to acquire 
development land through expropriation, and capture incremental land value realised 




at its present zoning value, as part of a Value Capture program, might even be 
constitutionally justified. 
The Constitution (2012:25(3)) states about compensation payable in the event of 
expropriation that: 
“(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment 
must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the 
public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all 
relevant circumstances, including- 
   (a)   the current use of the property; 
   (b)   the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
   (c)   the market value of the property; 
  (d)   the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and 
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and 
   (e)   the purpose of the expropriation.” 
Having regard to the current use of the property corresponds with the arguments 
presented earlier to ignore any potential claimed that might be realised in terms of land 
re-zoning – as re-zoning entails changing the current use of land to another land use 
in terms of SPLUMA (2013). 
Having regard to the extent of direct state investment in the beneficial capital 
improvement of the property, links with the notion that public infrastructure leads to 
increased potential for maximising land value. It contributes to justifying the idea of 
implementing Value Capture, as the potential for realising value is created by society. 
The equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected 
might be supported by the notion that a Value Capture expropriation would only be 
applicable where the landowners undermine the development potential of the land. It 
could be considered as undermining or sterilisation of development potential if 
landowners themselves do not develop the land to its highest and best use, and also 
overprice the land or refuse to sell the land to a developer. A Value Capture 
expropriation might in this instance improve the equitable balance between the public 
and the land owner’s interests. In addition, expropriating land to prevent sterilisation 
of development potential might advance other national priorities such as equitable 




4.4.2 Additional public purposes 
Section 25 (2)(a) of the Constitution (2012) justifies expropriation “for a public purpose 
or in the public interest. Section 25 (4)(a) of the Constitution (2012) further states that 
“the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms to 
bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources”. Furthermore the 
Constitution (2012:25) states that: 
“(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain 
access to land on an equitable basis.” 
Expropriating land from a person who neither intends to develop the land to its 
potential, nor intends making the land available for development at a feasible price, 
seems to fall within the scope of reforms to bring about equitable access to land. It 
also seems to be a reasonable legislative measure within the state’s available 
resources to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis. 
4.5 Conclusion of the legal discourse 
Interesting implications and twists arose from the discourse, which have been 
connected into the existing broader academic debates on Value Capture in order to 
derive a useful solution to the problem statement. 
The discourse has shown that existing sources of law apparently fail to stimulate 
equitable access to, and sustainable development of non-mineral development land. 
The discourse furthermore justifies that principles found in the mineral rights legislation 
should be applied to overcome ownership constraints to developing non-mineral land 
– which could promote equitable access to, and sustainable development of land. 
The discourse demonstrates how expropriation might be used as a method of 
overcoming ownership constraints to development. The South African legislative 
framework potentially offers developers the opportunity to overcome ownership 
constraints by applying to the Minister of Public Works to expropriate the land and 
make it available to the developer for re-zoning development. 
The discourse demonstrates that SPLUMA (2013) might have enacted a loophole in 




Such compensation could potentially be set below the residual land value realisable 
by re-zoning development, which creates a value increment available for capture by 
Value Capture. 
An expropriation for the purpose of developing the land to its highest and best use – 
with certain pre-suppositions as demonstrated in this discourse – could be justifiable 
as it furthers public purposes. The public purpose derives from the potential for Value 
Capture that it could create. Public purpose could also derive from the improved 
equitable access to land and sustainable development of land that it might promote. 
4.6 Commentary on validity and reliability 
Law is normative, because it prescribes what human behaviour should be. The validity 
of this legal doctrinal research therefore does not rely on an appeal to any external 
reality, but rest upon developing a consensus about its findings within the scholastic 
community (Chynoweth, 2008). This doctrinal research study can be seen as a step 
in the direction to consensus on a doctrine, and accordingly discussion and criticism 
is expected to arise as a result of the research. The reader should therefore not 
discredit the validity of the research when differing in opinion with the findings of the 
discourse, but embrace it as part of a process in developing consensus on the doctrine 
within the legal community.  
As stated in the methodology chapter, legal analysis involves reasoning by using a 
variety of techniques to construct a convincing argument according to accepted, 
instinctive conventions of discourse within the discipline. The discourse that was used 
to conduct this study applied legal rules to a hypothetical factual situation by means of 
deductive logic. It was further complimented with analogical legal reasoning, which 
involved examining previously resolved court cases that are apparently similar, to 
determine whether the legal rules were applicable. Inductive legal reasoning 
furthermore created general rules from specific previously resolved cases to 
supplement the legal reasoning.  The credibility of this research can thus be attributed 
thereto that the accepted conventions and norms of legal discourse – as set out in the 






The study found by means of a literature review that South Africa needs additional 
funding for public infrastructure. The literature demonstrated that Value Capture is a 
potential source of such funding. The literature further demonstrated that maximising 
land value by developing the land is required for Value Capture to be effective. 
Ownership constraints to development were however found in the literature, which 
could prevent development in South Africa. 
The study therefor investigated whether the development promoting principles found 
in mineral rights legislation can be applied to non-mineral land, to enable developers 
to develop land without being constrained by landownership. Doctrinal legal research 
was conducted by writing a legal discourse. No clear cut application was found to exist 
in sources of law for overcoming ownership constraints to non-mineral land with 
development potential. The study however demonstrated how the principles found in 
mineral rights legislation might be applied to enable a developer to legally acquire land 
for development, when the landowner refuses to sell or demands an unreasonable 
price. It was demonstrated how land might be expropriated for re-zoning and 
development purposes – effectively overcoming ownership constraints to 
development. The study also showed how expropriation for the purpose of maximising 
land value might be constitutionally justified within the context of Value Capture and 
other national land priorities. 
5.1 Suggested further research 
Further research would have to be done in order for the application proposed in this 
study to be implemented successfully. 
5.1.1 The public purpose element of an expropriation for development 
One specific aspect that would require further research revolves around the public 
purpose aspect of the proposed expropriation.  
The typical mechanism proposed would require that a developer asks the state to 
expropriate land – and grant or sell the land to the developer – in return that the 
developer pledges a percentage of the profits to the state in return. Profits are only 
realised at the end of a property development. Such public purpose might therefor be 




public purpose is sufficient to allow the minster of public works to expropriate land in 
terms of Section 2 of the Expropriation Act. 
The study also states that land could be expropriated to promote equitable access to 
land – which is seen as public purpose. Whilst this may well be a public purpose, 
equitable access to land is not explored in great detail in this study. Further analysis 
is required to determine how equitable access to land might be furthered by the 
expropriation model proposed in the study – and how such equitable access to land 
might serve as a motivation for expropriating land for development purposes. 
5.1.2 Application of the proposed expropriation 
Another aspect that requires further analyses is the application of the proposed 
expropriation for development purposes. There is a difference between the application 
found in the MPRDA, and that proposed by the study: 
 The MPRDA only removes certain rights from landownership, i.e. rights relating 
to minerals – and confers the power on the State to grant these rights to a third 
party. Rights that do not relate to minerals remain intact for the owner. Where 
the remaining ownership rights do not prevent the exploitation of mineral rights, 
it might be possible for the landowner to use his remaining rights concurrently 
with mineral rights exploitation. The landowner is also restored to a position of 
enjoying his remaining ownership rights once minerals have been extracted and 
any mines on the land have been issued with closure certificates. It is only in 
certain extreme circumstances that the State will expropriate full ownership 
rights under the application of the MPRDA.  
 In order for the concept presented in this study to work, it appears that the State 
would have to expropriate full ownership rights, as this appears to be the only 
way that a developer might sell the development and pay a portion to the state 
as part of value capture. Such application goes far beyond that found in the 
MPRDA. 
It is not clear which property rights might remain with a landowner under the application 
proposed by this study, and which rights would have to be expropriated. This matter 




The MPRDA furthermore removes and grants property rights relating to minerals by 
operation of law. A similar law of general application would have to be created to 
formalise the taking and granting of the potential development right. Such law would 
have to deal with the detail and proper procedures of the concept proposed by the 
study. 
Further research in this regard might include an elaborate legislative review, seeking 
to understand the views of all stakeholders involved, in order to propose applicable 
policy for regulating and enabling developers to capitalise on the development 
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